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This	  paper	  claims	  that	  public	  administrations	  are	  central	  players	  in	  the	  policy	  process.	  Hence,	  
the	  control	  over	  and	  organization	  of	  civil	  services	  represent	  core	  state	  powers.	  The	  puzzles	  
that	   emerge	   are	   therefore:	   which	   administrative	   system	   underpins	   supranational	   policy-­‐
making;	  and	  which	  consequences	  does	  participation	   in	   the	  European	  Administrative	  Space	  
entail	   for	   the	   autonomy	   of	   national	   bureaucracies?	   I	   confront	   the	   theoretical	   challenge,	  
namely	   the	   analytical	   description	   for	   the	   EAS,	   proposing	   a	   policy-­‐centered	   approach	   that	  
captures	  the	  EAS	  along	  the	  four	  dimensions	  administrative	  tasks,	  authority,	  instruments,	  and	  
actor	  constellations.	  The	  empirical	  challenge	   is	  how	  to	  measure	  a	  supranational	   impact	  on	  
national	   civil	   services.	   Drawing	   on	   a	   complementarity	   view	   of	   political	   and	   administrative	  
action	   in	   public	   administration	   research,	   a	   set	   of	   variables	   is	   applied	   to	   the	   EAS	   and	   the	  
German	  national	  bureaucracy.	  The	  results	  show	  that	  not	  only	  the	  EAS	  but	  also	  the	  participa-­‐
tion	  of	   the	  German	  administration	  herein	   increase	   the	  distance	  between	   the	  political	   and	  
administrative	  realm	  but,	  at	  the	  same,	  also	  reduce	  drastically	  the	  ability	  of	  administrations	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Introduction:  Bureaucracies and Core State Powers	  
 
Why	  should	  one	  care	  about	  bureaucracies	  when	  challenging	  the	  widely	  held	  assumption	  that	  
core	  state	  powers	  remain	  essentially	  unaffected	  from	  regional	  integration?	  And	  why	  should	  
we	  consider	  national	  civil	  services	  when	  claiming	  that	  the	  European	  Union’s	  de	  facto	  power	  
reaches	  well	  beyond	  that	  of	  an	  acclaimed	  regulatory	  polity?	  This	  paper	  builds	  on	  the	  claim	  
that	  bureaucracies	  are	  a	  core	   institution	  of	  modern	  statehood	  (Weber	  1947),	  and	  that	   the	  
world	   of	   politics	   and	   administration	   are	   not	   neatly	   separated	   (Aberbach,	   Putnam	   et	   al.	  
1981).	   It	   is	   argued	   that	   despite	   the	   formal	   absence	   of	   supranational	   competences	   on	   na-­‐
tional	  bureaucracies,	  supranational	  policy-­‐making	  has	  an	  impact	  on	  state-­‐level	  civil	  services.	  
While	  many	  scholars	  may	  intuitively	  agree	  to	  these	  starting	  points,	  a	  rigorous	  empirical	  ex-­‐
amination	   of	   presumed	   impacts	   faces	   serious	   theoretical	   and	   methodological	   challenges	  
(Olsen	   2003:	   507).	   In	   order	   to	   tackle	   this	   defiance	   and	   to	   provide	   answers	   to	   the	   above-­‐
raised	  questions,	  I	  will	  present	  a	  conceptual	  framework	  of	  how	  to	  depict	  the	  so-­‐called	  Euro-­‐
pean	  Administrative	  Space	  (EAS).	  Starting	  from	  a	  policy	  perspective,	  the	  EAS	  is	  systematically	  
described	  by	  distinguishing	  the	  underlying	  administrative	  processes,	  authority,	  instruments,	  
and	  actor	  constellations.	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  this	  conceptual	  sketch,	  I	  will	  then	  analyze	  how	  the	  
policy-­‐making	   in	  the	  EAS	  at	   large	  and	   in	  Germany	  as	  exemplary	  national	  administration	  af-­‐
fects	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  political	  and	  administrative	  realms	  in	  order	  to	  trace	  the	  
effect	  of	  multilevel	  administration	  on	  core	  state	  powers.	  	  	  
	  
Before	  delving	  into	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  European	  Administrative	  Space,	  the	  fairly	  illusive	  term	  
has	   to	  be	  defined	  more	  precisely	  not	   least	   to	   clarify	   the	   relevance	  of	   studying	   it.	   The	  EAS	  
does	  not	  represent	  a	  unitary,	   integrated	  administrative	  system.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	   it	   is	  not	  
merely	   the	   sum	   of	   27	   national	   bureaucracies	   plus	   the	   European	   Commission	   as	   suprana-­‐
tional	  secretariat.	  In	  general	  terms	  “the	  European	  administrative	  space	  is	  the	  area	  in	  which	  
increasingly	  integrated	  administrations	  jointly	  exercise	  powers	  delegated	  to	  the	  EU	  in	  a	  sys-­‐
tem	  of	  shared	  sovereignty”	  (Hofmann	  2008:	  671).	  The	  little	  specific	  notion	  of	  an	  area	  –	  or	  of	  
a	  space	  –	  indicates	  the	  ambiguous	  localization	  of	  bureaucratic	  authority	  in	  the	  process	  of	  EU	  
policy-­‐making.	  This	  holds,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	   for	   the	  boundaries	  of	  EU	   jurisdiction	  that	  pro-­‐
duces	   systematically	   externalities	   for	   administrative	   systems	   outside	   the	   Union.	   Most	  
prominently,	  this	  has	  happened	  in	  the	  process	  of	  enlargement	  in	  which	  the	  EU	  acted	  inten-­‐
tionally	  towards	  administrative	  reforms	  in	  the	  candidate	  states.	  With	  significantly	  less	  lever-­‐
age,	  similar	  dynamics	  also	  apply	  to	  the	  European	  Neighborhood	  Policy.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  
bureaucratic	   authority	   is	   split	   between	   the	   levels	   of	   governance	   during	   the	   policy-­‐making	  
process.	  Most	  evidently,	   the	  right	   for	   legislative	   initiative	   lies	   in	   the	  hands	  of	   the	  Commis-­‐
sion,	  which	  acts	  as	  central	  supranational	  administration.	  The	  implementation	  of	  legal	  acts	  is,	  
in	  contrast,	   formally	  a	  prerogative	  of	  national	  administrations	  –	  even	   if	   this	   formal	   right	   is	  
practically	  watered	  down	  by	  Comitology	  and	  other	  practices.	  Furthermore,	  that	  administra-­‐
tions	   are	   increasingly	   integrated	   is	   reflected	   in	   various	   ways,	   least	   however	   by	   top-­‐down	  
harmonization	  of	  national	  systems.	  The	  following	  theoretical	  section	  focuses	  on	  how	  to	  con-­‐
ceptualize	   the	   vertical	   and	   horizontal	   interaction	  modes	   between	   different	   administrative	  
actors	  (national:	  civil	  services;	  supranational:	  Commission;	  independent:	  agencies).	  In	  short,	  I	  
will	   systematically	  map	   how	   administrations	   interact	   in	   the	   EAS	   and	  mark	   out	   integration	  
mechanisms	   that	  underpin	   the	  multifaceted	  compound	  system.	  Vital	  about	   these	  adminis-­‐
trative	  interaction	  modes	  is	  that	  they	  grow	  from	  the	  rules	  on	  policy-­‐making.	  They	  are	  not	  the	  
result	   of	   the	   institutional	   engineering	   of	   a	   unitary	  multi-­‐level	   bureaucratic	   apparatus.	   For	  







example,	  the	  authoritative	  way	  in	  which	  the	  Commission	  supervises	  the	  distribution	  of	  agri-­‐
cultural	  funds	  to	  single	  farmers	  by	  national	  payment	  offices	  differs	  cardinally	  from	  the	  hori-­‐
zontal	  network	  national	  units	  have	  already	  built	  up	  during	  the	  era	  of	  European	  Political	  Co-­‐
ordination	  (EPC)	   in	  the	  foreign	  policy	  realm,	  or	  the	  coordination	  function	  of	  Europol	   in	  the	  
area	  of	  police	  cooperation.	  Whereas	  in	  the	  former	  area	  the	  Commission	  issues	  detailed	  rules	  
on	  administrative	  practices	  on	  the	  ground,	  the	  EPC	  marked	  a	  horizontal	  information	  network	  
that	   linked	  national	   foreign	  ministries	  directly	   (Hill	  1996),	  which	   is	  similarly	   the	  purpose	  of	  
Europol,	  an	  agency	  that	  coordinates	  national	  police	  systems	  without	  conferring	  substantive	  
competences	  to	  the	  EU	  level	  (Brady	  2008).	  The	  very	  nature	  of	  the	  powers	  delegated	  to	  the	  
EU	   determines	   therefore	   the	   specificity	   of	   the	   EAS.	   The	   historical	   example	   illustrates	   this	  
insight.	  Obviously,	   in	  1957	  and	  the	  years	  to	  follow,	  few	  national	  administrators	  working	  on	  
core	  economic	  policies	  would	  know	  Brussels	  very	  intimately.	  Today,	  national	  officials	  act	  in	  
more	  than	  200	  Comitology	  committees	  and	  participate	  in	  the	  formulation	  of	  implementation	  
rules	  on	  a	  daily	  basis.	  The	  extent	  and	  kind	  of	   involvement	  depends	  on	  the	  concrete	  policy	  
dealt	   with	   because	   sovereignty	   is	   shared	   to	   different	   degrees,	   as	   indicated	   by	   distinction	  
between	   “exclusive”,	   “shared”,	   and	   “supporting”	   supranational	   competences	   (TFU,	   Title	   I,	  
Art.	  2).	  The	   following	   features	   therefore	  characterize	   the	  EAS:	   it	   is	  a	  multi-­‐level	   compound	  
administrative	  system	  (rather	  than	  a	  system	  of	  administrative	  federalism),	  it	  is	  strongly	  pol-­‐
icy-­‐dependent	  procedure-­‐driven	  (rather	  than	  based	  on	  a	  unitary	  institutional	  administrative	  
framework),	   it	   is	  differentiated	   by	   policies	   (rather	   than	   a	   small	   number	   of	   codified	   proce-­‐
dures),	  and	  it	  thus	  represents	  an	  increasingly	  complex	  new	  form	  of	  network	  administration	  
(rather	  than	  leading	  to	  convergence	  of	  national	  systems).	  	  
	  
But	  why	  bother	  about	  this	  diffuse,	  if	  not	  tedious	  administrative	  space?	  What	  is	  the	  relevance	  
of	   finding	  out	  how	  this	  compound,	  procedure-­‐driven	  administrative	  space	  works?	  The	  EAS	  
matters	   if	  we	   perceive	   of	   public	   administrations	   as	  more	   than	  mere	   adjutants	   to	   execute	  
political	  decisions.	  The	  dichotomy	  between	  politics	  and	  public	  administration	  based	  on	  the	  
assumption	  that	  the	  two	  spheres	  operate	  separately	  has	  been	  challenged	  on	  theoretical	  and	  
empirical	  grounds	  (Svara	  2001;	  Demir	  and	  Nyhan	  2008).	  Bureaucracies	  play	  vital	  roles,	  most	  
evidently	   in	   the	   implementation	   of	   public	   policies.	   Taking	   a	   complementary	   view	   (Demir	  
2009),	  interactions	  between	  elected	  and	  appointed	  officials	  are	  (and	  should	  be)	  much	  more	  
embracing.	  In	  consequence,	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  functioning	  civil	  service	  is	  a	  core	  compo-­‐
nent	  of	   state	   formation;	   administrative	   capacities	   are	   a	   core	  element	  of	   good	  governance	  
and	   organizing	   and	   controlling	   a	   bureaucratic	   apparatus	   represents	   a	   core	   state	   power.	  
Against	   this	   background,	   the	   compound	   EAS	   that	   blurs	   the	   distinction	   between	   suprana-­‐
tional	   and	   national	   levels	   raises	   inevitably	   questions	   about	   changes	   in	   the	   interaction	   be-­‐
tween	  elected	  and	  appointed	  officials.	  The	  EU	  offers	  an	  ideal	  case	  to	  explore	  how	  suprana-­‐
tional	   policy-­‐making	   with	   limited	   own	   administrative	   resources	   penetrates	   national	   civil	  
services.	  Suffice	   it	   to	   look	  at	  the	  mere	  figures:	  national	  much	  rather	  than	  Brussels	  bureau-­‐
crats	  administer	  the	  European	  Union.	  The	  European	  Commission	  counts	  some	  32,000	  staffi,	  
an	  astonishingly	  small	  number	  in	  face	  of	  a	  population	  of	  over	  500	  million	  EU	  citizens.	  Look-­‐
ing	  from	  the	  angle	  of	  any	   international	  organization,	  these	  figures	  will	  not	  raise	  many	  eye-­‐
brows.	  And	  indeed,	  the	  EU	  was	   initially	  based	  on	  the	  principle	  of	  administrative	  autonomy	  
that	   left	  the	  execution	  of	  common	  decisions	  to	  the	  exclusive	  authority	  of	  sovereign	  states.	  
However,	  if	  we	  consider	  that	  the	  EU	  has	  developed	  far	  beyond	  clear-­‐cut	  inter-­‐state	  coopera-­‐
tion	   in	   core	  policies	   such	  as	  a	   single	  market	  and	  currency,	   internal	   security,	  external	   crisis	  
management	  and	  the	  like,	  the	  scarce	  own	  administrative	  resources	  are	  striking.	  How	  can	  we	  
systematically	  account	  for	  these	  administrative	  underpinning	  of	  EU	  governance?	  	  
	  







Conceptual Framework:  A Policy-focused Definition of the EAS 
	  
Attention	  on	  the	  EAS	  has	  risen.ii	  Yet	  the	  concept	  remains	  illusive	  and	  insufficiently	  defined.	  
The	  term	  EAS	  stands	  for	  an	  integrated	  administration	  short	  of	  either	  intended	  harmonization	  
or	  unintended	  convergence	  of	  its	  constituent	  national	  parts.	  This	  challenge	  of	  capturing	  the	  
EAS	  is	  linked	  to	  broader	  questions	  about	  the	  ontology	  of	  the	  EU	  polity.	  In	  essence,	  “if	  the	  EU	  
is	  not	  adequately	  described	  as	  regulatory	  polity,	  how	  should	  it	  be	  described”	  (Genschel	  and	  
Jachtenfuchs)?	  The	  conceptual	  starting	  point	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  EAS	  is	  
established	  by	  procedures	  in	  the	  policy	  process	  and	  not	  by	  a	  designed	  overreaching	  adminis-­‐
trative	  organization	  or	  harmonized	  administrative	  model.	   In	   consequence,	   I	  will	   tackle	   the	  
problem	   from	  a	  policy	   rather	   than	  an	   institutional	   angle.	  Drawing	   in	  particular	  on	   insights	  
from	  multilevel	  governance	  research,	  this	  approach	  allows	  capturing	  the	  specific	  governance	  
modes	  and	  structures	   independent	  from	  (absent)	   institutions	   in	  the	  narrower	  sense	  of	  for-­‐
malized	  harmonized	  rules	  on	  some	  kind	  of	  codified	  “European	  administration”.	  To	  describe	  
the	  EAS,	  attention	   is	  drawn	  on	  administrative	  actions	   (practices),	   administrative	   tasks	   (the	  
location	   of	   responsibilities	   in	   the	   multilevel	   setup),	   administrative	   cooperation	   (instru-­‐
ments),	  and	  administrative	   interaction	  patterns	  (actor	  constellations).	  This	   leads	  to	  the	  fol-­‐
lowing	  questions	  about	  multilevel	  administration:	  
	  
• policy	  process	  /	  administrative	  action:	  which	  tasks	  are	  fulfilled	  by	  whom?	  
• policy	  problems	  /	  administrative	  authority:	  how	  are	  responsibilities	  divided?	  	  
• policy	  instruments	  /	  administrative	  tools:	  how	  do	  the	  levels	  interact?	  
• Policy	  networks	  /	  administrative	  roles:	  how	  are	  actors	  related	  to	  each	  other?	  	  	  
	  
From	  a	  public	  policy	  perspective,	  answering	  these	  questions	  will	  draw	  a	  comprehensive	  pic-­‐
ture	  of	  the	  compound,	  process-­‐driven,	  and	  multilevel	  administration	  because	  it	  captures	  the	  
key	  features	  of	  public	  administration:	  tasks,	  authority,	  instruments,	  actor	  constellations.	  	  
	  
First,	  who	  does	  what?	  Which	  administrative	  tasks	  do	  the	  supranational	  and	  national	  actors	  
complete	   in	   EU	   policy-­‐making?	   Figure	   one	   reproduces	   the	   classical	   policy	   cycle	   heuristic	  
(Howlett	   and	   Ramesh	   2003:	   13)	   and	   relates	   each	   stage	   to	   the	   respective	   bureaucratic	   in-­‐
volvement	  of	   the	  national	  and	   supranational	  administrative	  actors.	  Obviously,	   this	   illustra-­‐
tion	  does	  not	  provide	  any	  explanatory	  model	  (deLeon	  1999),	  but	  it	  bares	  necessary	  informa-­‐
tion	  on	  the	  procedural	  involvement	  of	  bureaucracies	  in	  policy-­‐making.	  Above	  all,	  it	  indicates	  
that	  the	  predominant	  focus	  on	  Comitology	  as	  the	  shared	  moment	  of	  national/supranational	  
bureaucratic	   interaction	   falls	   short	  of	   the	  much	  wider	   compound	  administrative	  practices.	  
The	   relevant	   information	   revealed	   is	   that	   at	   each	   stage	   both	   the	   Commission	   as	   suprana-­‐
tional	  and	  national	  administrations	  are	  involved,	  and	  that	  the	  emphasis	  and	  significance	  for	  
the	  EU	  policy-­‐making	  process	  vary	  from	  stage	  to	  stage	  (bolt	  print	  for	  dominant	  administra-­‐
tive	   actor,	   Fig.	   1).	   Agenda	   setting	   and	   policy	   formulation	   are	   primarily	   perceived	   as	   the	  
Commission’s	  stronghold	  based	  on	  the	  exclusive	  right	  to	  initiate	  EU	  legislation.	  The	  issuing	  of	  
white	  and	  green	  books	  as	  well	  as	  legislative	  acts	  themselves	  is	  hence	  also	  the	  most	  relevant	  
administrative	  act	  in	  these	  stages.	  However,	  initiation	  is	  accompanied	  by	  input	  and	  exchange	  
with	   national	   governmental,	   EU	   parliamentary	   and	   non-­‐state	   actors.	   Scrutinizing	   to	  which	  
extent	  the	  Commission	  really	  uses	  its	  right	  to	  initiative	  independently,	  Rasmussen	  concludes	  
that	  both	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  the	  member	  states	  in	  the	  Council	  are	  able	  to	  exert	  
informal	  agenda-­‐setting	  power,	  “both	  because	  the	  Commission	  has	  been	  willing	  to	  accede	  to	  
their	   requests,	   and	   because	   they	   possess	   important	   sanctioning	   tools	   in	   the	   event	   that	   it	  
does	  not”	  (Rasmussen	  2007:	  261).	  In	  policy	  areas	  in	  which	  a	  member	  states	  has	  high	  stakes,	  







the	  domestic	  administration	  can	   try	   to	   intervene	  early	  on,	  either	   through	   its	  own	  national	  
representation	  (most	  relevantly	  the	  COREPER),	  or	  by	  feeding	  in	  information	  and	  knowledge	  
to	  the	  Council	  Secretariat	  –	  which	  does,	  nonetheless,	  not	  mean	  that	  all	  member	  states	  have	  
the	  resources	  or	  awareness	  to	  have	  developed	  the	  needed	  early	  warning	  mechanisms	  and	  
informal	  channels	  to	  intervene	  at	  this	  stage	  on	  a	  regular	  basis.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  1:	   Administrative	  tasks	  in	  the	  EU	  policy	  process	  	  
	  
	  
Source:	  own	  figure	  
	  
In	   contrast,	   during	   the	   decision-­‐making	   phase,	   national	   bureaucracies	   are	   central	   players	  
since	  they	  coordinate	  and	  deliver	   the	  national	  position	  to	  be	  represented	  by	  the	  COREPER	  
and/or	  political	   representatives	   in	   the	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  or	  European	  Council.	  The	  Com-­‐
mission	  gains	  a	  dominant	  role	  only	  in	  case	  of	  conflict	  and	  if	  a	  trialogue	  is	  set	  up	  to	  overcome	  
deadlock	   in	   the	  decision-­‐making	  between	   the	  Council	   and	   the	   EP.	   In	   order	   to	   find	   a	   com-­‐
promise	  in	  the	  trialogue,	  the	  Commission	  refers	  again	  back	  to	  its	  right	  to	  initiative	  in	  propos-­‐
ing	  alternatives	  but	  becomes	  at	  the	  same	  time	  an	  actor	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  procedure.	  As	  
mentioned	  above,	  implementation	  is	  the	  obvious	  stage	  in	  which	  national	  and	  supranational	  
administrators	   meet	   within	   the	   framework	   of	   Comitology,	   i.e.	   the	   negotiation	   for	   imple-­‐
menting	  acts	   for	  EU	   legislation	   in	   the	  multiplicity	  of	   committees	  made	  up	  by	  national	   and	  
supranational	  administrators.	  Policy	  evaluation	  gained	  significant	  relevance	  in	  the	  context	  of	  
Commission	  reforms	  that	  were	  realized	  after	  the	  Commission	  under	  President	  Santer	  had	  to	  
resign	  do	  to	  corruption	  allegations.	  On	  the	  Commission	  side,	  performance	  orientation	  (Pollitt	  
and	   Bouckaert	   2004:	   126)	   and	   systematic	   policy	   evaluations	   (Tholoniat	   2009)	   adhering	   to	  
new	  public	  management	  principles	  have	  been	   introduced	  under	   the	  Prodi	  and	  subsequent	  
Barroso	  Commissions	  (for	  a	  critical	  review:	  Levy	  2004).	  Despite	  the	  strong	  emphasis	  put	  on	  









MS:	  early	  warning	  &	  national	  
position	  formation,	  (informal	  
promotion	  national	  interests)	  
EU:	  green	  book	  /	  white	  book	  
formulation	  
MS:	  early	  warning	  &	  national	  position	  formation	  
EU:	  initiative	  of	  legislative	  act	  
MS:	  mandate	  for	  COREPER	  
EU:	  informal	  coordination	  
with	  Council	  /	  EP;	  	  
if	  conflict:	  trialogue	  
MS:	  implementation	  (application	  of	  EU	  law)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  COMITOLOGY	  
EU:	  supervision	  (guardian	  of	  Treaty)	  
MS:	  self-­‐evaluation	  &	  	  
reporting	  to	  Comm.	  
EU:	  (a)	  COM	  internal	  	  
impact	  assessment;	  	  
(b)	  oversight	  over	  	  
member	  state	  compliance	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issue.	  The	  Commission	  suffers	  from	  very	  limited	  resources	  to	  exercise	  effective	  oversight	  on	  
the	  lower	  echelons	  that	  implement	  policies	  in	  the	  multilevel	  system	  (Dimitrakopoulous	  and	  
Richardson	  2001:	  349-­‐52).	  Effective	  compliance	  control	  beyond	  outputs	  in	  form	  of	  national	  
regulation	  depends	  heavily	  on	  self-­‐evaluations	  of	  outcomes	  by	   the	  national	  administrators	  
themselves.	   While	   in	   the	   evaluation	   stage	   the	   supranational	   and	   national	   levels	   formally	  
stand	  in	  a	  hierarchical	  relationship,	  the	  limited	  resources	  of	  the	  Commission	  turn	  evaluation	  
de	  facto	  into	  a	  joint	  venture	  based	  largely	  on	  self-­‐reporting.	  	  	  
	  
	  

















Source:	  own	  figure	  
	  
The	  second	  question	  touches	  on	  administrative	  authority,	  which	  in	  a	  multilevel	  framework	  
stands	  for	  the	  division	  of	  competences	  across	  the	   levels	  of	  the	  polity.	  Figure	  two	  depicts	  a	  
schematic	  overview	  of	  the	  main	  bureaus	  on	  the	  different	  levels	  and	  various	  functional	  units	  
that	  participate	  in	  the	  EAS.	  Officially,	  the	  European	  Commission	  as	  central	  bureau	  (Egeberg	  
2002)	  and	  the	  member	  state	  administrations	  with	  their	  respective	  sub-­‐state	  administrative	  
entities	  are	  endowed	  with	  administrative	  authority.	  Authority	  remains	  either	  with	  the	  mem-­‐
ber	  states,	   it	   is	  exclusively	  delegated	  to	   the	  Commission,	  or	   it	   is	   shared	  vertically	  between	  
the	  national	  and	  supranational	  levels.	  In	  formal	  terms,	  the	  EU	  has	  no	  competences	  over	  na-­‐
tional	  public	  administrations.	  That	  means	  the	  Commission	  cannot	  initiate	  legislation	  to	  har-­‐
monize	  administrative	  law	  in	  the	  member	  states	  and	  there	  is	  no	  single	  EU	  model	  of	  admini-­‐
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competence,	  it	  has	  however	  some	  de	  facto	  authority	  over	  national	  administrations.	  In	  turn,	  
national	  administrations	  impact	  on	  the	  Commission	  that	  depends	  on	  national	  resources	  for	  
policy	   implementation	  but	  also	  policy	   formulation	   (solid	  double-­‐arrowed	  arrows,	  Fig.	  2).	   In	  
addition,	   the	  past	   twenty	   years	   have	   seen	   the	  proliferation	  of	   different	   forms	  of	   agencies	  
that	  fulfill	  a	  wide	  range	  of	   legal,	   technical,	  or	  scientific	  tasks	  (Wonka	  and	  Rittberger	  2010).	  
The	  five	  types	  of	  agencies	  operate	  with	  varying	  degrees	  of	  autonomy	  delegated	  by	  the	  EU	  
and	  member	  state	  authorities.	  Still	  very	  much	  within	  the	  traditional	  Commission	  /	  member	  
state	  administrative	  coordination	  fall	  the	  six	  executive	  agencies	  that	  manage	  aspects	  of	  se-­‐
lected	  EU	  program	   for	   a	   limited	  period	  of	   time	  are	  directly	   subordinated	   to	   the	  European	  
Commission	  and	  –	  unlike	  the	  other	  agencies	  –	  are	  based	  in	  Brussels	  or	  Luxembourg.	  In	  terms	  
of	  authority,	  the	  agencies	  play	  a	  subordinate	  role	  (solid	  arrow,	  Fig.	  2).	   In	  contrast,	  the	  cur-­‐
rently	   23	   Community	   agencies	   have	   an	   independent	   legal	   personality	   and	   are	   accordingly	  
placed	  outside	  the	  administrative	  hierarchy	  proper.	  These	  agencies	  are	  mostly	  jointly	  set	  up	  
and	   controlled	   by	   the	  member	   states	   and	   the	   Commission.	  Most	   depend	   on	   Community	  
budget,	  while	  a	  number	  of	  Community	  agencies	  are	  financially	  independent.	  They	  are	  active	  
in	  areas	  from	  aviation	  safety	  to	  fundamental	  rights,	  chemicals,	  environment	  and	  food	  safety.	  
The	  third	  and	  smaller	  group	  of	  agencies	  is	  occupied	  with	  special	  tasks	  in	  intergovernmentally	  
organized	  policy	  sectors.	  It	  comprises	  agencies	  of	  the	  Common	  Foreign	  and	  Security	  Policy	  (3	  
agencies),	  police	  and	   juridical	  cooperation	   in	  criminal	  matters	   (3	  agencies)	  and	  Euratom	  (2	  
agencies)	   (dotted	   arrows	   to	   indicate	   the	   limited	   authority	   the	   Commission	   and	   member	  
states	  have	  over	  the	  agencies	  –	  and	  vice	  versa,	  Fig.	  2).iii	  Together,	  the	  Commission,	  national	  
and	  subnational	  administrations	  and	  agencies	  create	  an	  interlaced	  network	  of	  administrative	  
governance.iv	  In	  order	  to	  capture	  the	  mechanisms	  that	  underpin	  the	  convoluted	  vertical	  and	  
horizontal	  linkages,	  I	  will	  turn	  to	  the	  policy	  instruments.	  	  
	  
Public	  policy	   instrumentation	  “reveals	  a	   (fairly	  explicit)	   theorization	  of	   the	   relationship	  be-­‐
tween	  the	  governing	  and	  the	  governed:	  every	   instrument	  constitutes	  a	  condensed	  form	  of	  
knowledge	  about	  social	  control	  and	  ways	  of	  exercising	  it”	  (Lascoumes	  and	  Le	  Gales	  2007:	  1).	  
In	  this	  vein,	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  instruments	  at	  work	  in	  the	  EU	  brings	  to	  the	  fore	  how	  author-­‐
ity	  is	  organized	  and	  exercised.	  How	  these	  different	  levels	  and	  units	  of	  administration	  interact	  
is	  scrutinized	  by	  a	  systematic	  stocktaking	  of	  the	  policy	  instruments	  through	  which	  suprana-­‐
tional	  policy-­‐making	  impacts	  on	  national	  public	  administrations.v	  The	  two	  by	  two	  table	  (Ta-­‐
ble	  1)	  draws	  from	  governance	  approaches	  and	  Europeanization	  research.	  Governance	  schol-­‐
ars	  distinguish	  between	  hierarchical	  and	  non-­‐hierarchical	  governance	  modes.	  Applied	  to	  the	  
EAS	  this	  means	  that	  instruments	  are	  either	  based	  on	  legally	  binding	  authority	  over	  national	  
administrative	  organization,	  practices	  and	  tasks,	  or	  coordination	  is	  based	  on	  non-­‐hierarchical	  
modes.	   The	   second	   dimension	   refers	   to	   the	   kinds	   of	   policy-­‐making	   through	  which	   the	   EU	  
“hits	   home”	   and	   changes	   domestic	   public	   administrations.	  Whereas	   explicit	   supranational	  
rules	   deal	   directly	   with	   public	   administrations,	   i.e.	   formulate	   rules	   about	   civil	   services	   as	  
such,	  the	  EU	  affects	  domestic	  structures	  and	  practices	  implicitly	  where	  the	  implementation	  
of	   common	  policies	   entails	   (unintended)	   adaptations	  of	   domestic	   administrations.	  Accord-­‐
ingly,	  the	  most	  binding	  and	  far-­‐reaching	  form	  of	  supranational	  penetration	  are	  legally	  bind-­‐
ing	  standards	  that	  regulate	  national	  administrations	  directly	  (top	  left	  box,	  Tab.	  1).	  In	  the	  ab-­‐
sence	  of	  a	  formal	  competence,	  the	  EU	  can	  actually	  not	  issue	  such	  regulations.	  This	  notwith-­‐
standing	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  (ECJ)	  has	  produced	  a	  limited	  body	  of	  case	  law.	  Legal	  
scholars	   thus	   state	   the	  existence	  of	  basic	   administrative	  principles	   that	  have	  been	  harmo-­‐
nized	  by	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  ECJ.	  These	  principles	  are	  distinguished	  in	  four	  groups	  “1)	  reli-­‐
ability	   and	   predictability	   (legal	   certainty);	   2)	   openness	   and	   transparency;	   3)	   accountability	  
and	  4)	  efficiency	  and	  effectiveness”	   (Cardona	  1999:	  8).	  Case	   law	  has	  selectively	   filed	  these	  







principles	  with	  concrete	  meaning,	  as	  for	  instance	  in	  the	  case	  of	  administrative	  employment	  
(Nizzo	  2001:	  3;	  Bossaert,	  Demmke	  et	  al.	  2001).	  	  
	  
	  










Examples:	  general	  principles	  such	  as	  





Examples:	  agricultural	  payment	  agen-­‐





Examples:	  EUPAN,	  Common	  Assess-­‐
ment	  Framework	  (CAF)	  
	  
Policy	  Implementation	  
Examples:	  EU	  Directives	  in	  environ-­‐
mental,	  anti-­‐discrimination,	  intellectual	  
property,	  data	  protection	  	  
	  
Source:	  own	  table	  (cf.	  Heidbreder	  2011)	  
	  
	  
Likewise	   hierarchically,	   administrative	   ordinances	   (top	   right	   box,	   Tab.	   1)	   are	   based	  on	   the	  
duty	  of	  member	  states	  to	  implement	  EU	  policies.	  The	  leverage	  the	  Commission	  has	  over	  na-­‐
tional	  administrators	  derives	  from	  the	  executive	  powers	  delegated	  to	  her.	  In	  selected	  areas,	  
as	  for	  instance	  agricultural	  or	  environmental	  policy,	  the	  Commission	  can	  therefore	  issue	  de-­‐
tailed	   executive	  orders	   that	   imply	   in	   practice	   that	   national	   offices	   need	   to	   fully	   adopt	   the	  
hierarchically	   prescribed	  organization	   and	  practices	   of	   the	   implementing	  units.	   Services	   of	  
general	   interest	  are	  another	  example	   in	  which	  the	  EU	  can	  negatively	  define	  which	  services	  
do	  not	   fall	  under	   this	   category	  and	  hence	   the	  EU	  can	  effectively	   circumcise	  which	  policies	  
must	  not	  be	  dealt	  with	  by	  public	  bodies.vi	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  Commission	  can	  prescribe	  
administrative	  details	  for	  policy	  implementation	  depends	  on	  the	  executive	  powers	  delegated	  
to	  her.	  According	  to	  the	  founding	  treaties	  policy	  execution	  was	  originally	  exclusively	   in	  the	  
hands	  of	  national	  administrations.	  This	  moves	  us	  to	  the	  traditional	  form	  of	  indirect	  admini-­‐
stration	   (Ziller	   2005:	  214)	   (bottom	   right	  box,	   Tab.	  1).	  Nonetheless,	   adaptations	   in	  national	  
administrative	  structures	  or	  practices	  occur	  as	  side	  effects	  of	  the	  obligation	  to	  implement	  EU	  
law.	  Notably,	  these	  adaptations	  do	  not	  automatically	  lead	  to	  harmonization	  between	  mem-­‐
ber	   state	   administrations	   since	   different	   states	   may	   opt	   for	   very	   different	   administrative	  
responses	  within	  the	  logic	  of	  their	  administrative	  traditions	  and	  culture.	  Finally,	  the	  loosest	  
form	  of	  cooperation	   is	   the	  voluntary	  horizontal	  coordination	  between	  national	  administra-­‐
tors.	  The	  European	  Public	  Administration	  Network	  (EUPAN)	  was	  founded	  in	  the	  1970s	  as	  an	  
“informal	  network”	  and	  a	  “platform	  for	  exchange	  of	  views,	  experiences	  and	  good	  practices	  
to	   improve	   the	   performance,	   competitiveness	   and	   quality	   of	   European	   central	   public	   ad-­‐
ministrations”	  whose	   “vision”	   is	   to	   support	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   Lisbon	   strategy	   by	  
“placing	  the	  citizen	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  public	  management,	  by	  working	  in	  different	  areas	  (hu-­‐
man	  resources,	  innovation,	  quality,	  e-­‐government)	  and	  with	  different	  actors	  in	  order	  to	  sup-­‐
port	   efficiency	   and	   customer	   orientation	   in	   European	   public	   services”.vii	   EUPAN	   is	   accord-­‐
ingly	  a	  platform	  national	  public	  administration	  ministers	  use	   in	  biannual	  meetings	   that	  are	  
lead	  by	  the	  incumbent	  EU	  presidency	  but	  remain	  strictly	  voluntary	  in	  character.	  In	  sum,	  the	  







EU	  applies	  various	  instruments	  that	  effectively	  penetrate	  the	  role,	  the	  tasks,	  the	  powers,	  and	  
the	  practices	  of	  national	  administrations	  although	   the	  EU	   lacks	   regulatory	  competences	   to	  
harmonize	  national	  civil	  services.	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Source:	  own	  table	  
	  
	  
The	  overview	  on	  administrative	  authority	  above	   listed	  the	  main	  administrative	  bodies	   that	  
interact	  in	  the	  EAS.	  A	  closer	  look	  on	  administrative	  actors	  sheds	  light	  on	  the	  actor	  constella-­‐
tions	   and	  mutually	   dependent	   role	   definitions	   of	   the	   different	   units	   the	   various	   forms	   of	  
multilevel	   policy-­‐making.	   The	   focus	  on	  administrative	   actors	   is	   therefore	  derived	   from	   the	  
insights	  on	   the	   intersecting	  policy	   instruments	  and	   links	   this	   to	  our	   central	   research	  ques-­‐
tion:	  how	  does	  the	  EU	  interfere	  with	  core	  state	  powers?	  Table	  two	  depicts	  the	  various	  roles	  
national	   administrators	   have	   according	   to	   type	   of	   supranational	   rule	   and	   form	   of	   govern-­‐
ance.	  Where	  hierarchically	  binding	  administrative	  standards	  (top	  left	  box,	  Tab.	  2)	  apply,	  na-­‐
tional	  public	  administrations	  are	  subjects	  of	  EU	  authority,	  as	  for	  instance	  when	  national	  laws	  
have	  to	  be	  changed	  to	  accommodate	  foreign	  nationals	  as	  civil	  servants	   in	  accordance	  with	  
ECJ	  case	  law.	  Implementing	  EU	  policies	  in	  which	  the	  Commission	  has	  been	  delegated	  execu-­‐
tive	  powers,	  national	  administrations	  act	  quasi	  as	  executive	  bodies	  of	  the	  Commission	  that	  
prescribes	  the	  rules	  of	  how	  to	  implement	  a	  narrowly	  defined	  task	  (top	  right	  box,	  Tab.	  2).	  This	  
differs	   from	   traditional	   indirect	   administration	   that	   leaves	   it	   to	   the	   discretion	   of	   national	  
administrations	  how	  to	  implement	  EU	  law.	  Yet,	  the	  obligation	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  EU	  policy	  
goals	  can	  entail	  far-­‐reaching	  adaptations	  of	  domestic	  structures	  and	  practices	  (bottom	  right	  
box,	  Tab.	  2).	   Involving	   into	  voluntary	  coordination	  to	  exchange	  best	  practices,	  national	  ad-­‐
ministrations	  keep	  the	  largest	  degree	  of	  independence	  and	  act	  as	  independent	  actors	  on	  an	  
informal	   platform.	   These	   different	   roles	   indicate	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   administrative	   state	  
powers	  are	  affected	  by	  regional	  integration,	  especially	  by	  implicit	  supranational	  rule	  in	  day-­‐
to-­‐day	  policy-­‐making	  of	  the	  European	  Union.	  	  
	  
From	  the	  systematic	  analysis	  of	  tasks,	  authority,	  instruments	  and	  actor	  constellations	  in	  the	  
EAS,	  we	  can	  draw	  a	  number	  of	  conclusions	  about	  how	  to	  describe	  the	  multilevel	  administra-­‐
tion	  in	  absence	  of	  harmonizing	  top-­‐down	  regulation	  or	  bottom-­‐up	  convergence	  of	  national	  
public	  administrations:	  	  
	  







• Both	   the	   supranational	   and	   national	   public	   administrations	   are	   involved	   in	   each	  
stage	  of	  EU	  policy-­‐making	  with	  complementing	  responsibilities.	  The	  EU	  policy	  proc-­‐
ess	  builds	  on	  intersecting	  vertically	  shared	  administrative	  responsibilities.	  	  
• The	  division	  of	  authority	  is	  policy-­‐dependent;	  it	  ranges	  from	  national	  independence,	  
over	   a	   clear	   delegation	   to	   the	   supranational	   level	   in	  which	   case	   respective	   other	  
level	   has	   auxiliary	   functions,	   to	   fully	   shared	   responsibilities	   in	  which	   case	   admini-­‐
stration	   is	   carried	   out	   jointly.	   Administrative	  authority	   is	   partially	   delegated	   and	  
therefore	  split	  between	  political	  institutions	  and	  specialized	  agencies.	  	  
• Despite	   the	  absence	  of	   a	   formal	   supranational	   competence	  over	  national	   admini-­‐
strations,	  within	  the	  EU	  framework	  supranational	  actors	  apply	  a	  variety	  of	   instru-­‐
ments	  to	  penetrate	  national	  administrations.	  These	  range	  from	  general	  rules	  born	  
out	  of	  ECJ	  litigation	  to	  strictly	  horizontal	  state-­‐to-­‐state	  voluntary	  coordination.	  
• As	   the	   selection	  of	   a	  policy	   instrument	  of	  national	   administrative	  penetration	  de-­‐
pends	  on	   the	  division	  of	   administrative	   authority	   in	   the	  multilevel	   policy	  process,	  
actor	  roles	  depend	  on	  the	  respective	  instrument.	  Accordingly,	  the	  relationship	  be-­‐
tween	   the	   supranational	   and	   national	   administrations	   ranges	   from	   a	   hierarchical	  
principal-­‐agent	   relation	   to	   full	   independence	   of	   national	   administrations.	   Cross-­‐
level	  actor	  relationships	  depend	  on	  the	  policy	  stage	  and	  the	  policy	  content.	  	  	  
	  
The	  EAS	   is	   hence	  extremely	  pluralistic	   in	   its	   rules	   and	  procedures.	  Analytically,	   this	  makes	  
the	  EAS	  some	  kind	  of	  moving	  target	  –	  that	  is	  however	  ever	  present	  and	  therefore	  relevant	  to	  
be	  analyzed.	  	  
Empirical Analysis:  Transforming Administrative Core State Powers 
	  
In	  order	  to	  underpin	  the	  conceptual	  take	  on	  the	  EAS	  with	  empirical	  evidence,	  I	  will	  turn	  to	  
the	   second	   core	   question	   of	   the	   panel.	   “Why	   is	   the	   institutional	   development	   of	   the	   EU	  
pushing	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  regulatory	  polity	  model”	  (Genschel	  and	  Jachtenfuchs)?	  From	  
the	  above	  discussion	  follows	  one	  answer	  straightforwardly:	  because	  the	  EU	  impacts	  on	  core	  
state	   powers	   through	   a	  much	  wider	   range	   of	   instruments	   than	   regulation.	   The	   regulatory	  
polity	  model	  does	  not	  capture	  these	  implications	  of	  multilevel	  policy-­‐making.	  The	  notion	  of	  
the	  EU	  as	  regulatory	  state	  rests	  on	  the	  premise	  that	  for	  the	  EU	  steering	  by	  regulation	  is	  an	  
efficient	  way	  to	  rule	  in	  light	  of	  its	  scarce	  resources	  to	  redistribute	  (Majone	  1996).	  However,	  
the	  regulatory	  polity	  model	  neglects	  in	  particular	  the	  unintended	  and	  implicit	  impact	  of	  su-­‐
pranational	  policy	  processes.	  Even	  if	  the	  autonomy	  of	  national	  public	  administrations	  is	  not	  
subject	   to	   supranational	   regulation	   directly,	   participation	   in	   supranational	   policy-­‐making	  
changes	  tasks,	  authority,	  instruments	  and	  the	  actor	  constellations	  of	  national	  public	  admini-­‐
strations.	  Yet,	  even	  if	   it	  seems	  plausible	  that	  participation	  in	  EU	  policy-­‐making	  occupies	  re-­‐
sources	  and	  changes	  administrative	  practices	  or	  even	  organization	  partially,	  this	  answer	  can	  
hardly	   satisfy	   empirically.	   Which	   evidence	   gives	   a	   measurable	   indication	   of	   transforming	  
core	  state	  powers?	  
	  
The	  challenge	  for	  state	  powers	  over	  administration	  addressed	  here	  is	  not	  the	  reduced	  power	  
of	  traditional	  public	  administration	  –	  although	  there	  are	  strong	  claims	  that	  new	  public	  man-­‐
agement	   reforms	   and	   agencification	   produce	   such	   effects	   in	   the	   EU	   context	   (Egeberg	   and	  
Trondal	  2009b,	  a).	  However,	  the	  more	  deep-­‐rooted	  challenge	  emerges	  from	  the	  overlapping	  
EU	  tasks,	  authorities,	   instruments,	  and	  hence	  changed	  actor	  constellations	  that	  come	  hand	  
in	   glove	  with	   EU	   policy-­‐making.	   As	   pointed	   out	   in	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   paper,	   this	   puzzle	  







emerges	   from	  a	   complementary	   view	  on	  public	   administration	   according	   to	  which	  politics	  
and	  administration	  are	  not	  dichotomized	  but	  mutually	  supporting.	  	  
	  
“Complementartity	   entails	   ongoing	   interaction,	   reciprocal	   influence,	   and	  mutual	   deference	   be-­‐
tween	  elected	  officials	  and	  administrators.	  Administrators	  help	  to	  shape	  policy,	  and	  they	  give	   it	  
specific	  content	  and	  meaning	   in	  the	  process	  of	   implementation.	  Elected	  officials	  oversee	   imple-­‐
mentation,	  probe	  specific	  complaints	  about	  poor	  performance,	  and	  attempt	  to	  correct	  problems	  
with	   performance,	   and	   attempt	   to	   correct	   problems	   with	   performance	   through	   fine-­‐tuning.	  
Changes	   in	   governmental	   process	   that	   substantially	   expand	   political	   control	   and	  weaken	   inde-­‐
pendence	  […]	  weaken	  the	  dialogue	  between	  elected	  officials	  and	  administrators”	  	  
(Svara	  2001:	  180).	  	  
The	  core	  argument	  developed	  on	  the	  preceding	  pages	   is	  that	  the	   involvement	   in	  EU	  policy	  
processes	  marks	  such	  a	  change	  in	  governmental	  process.	  The	  theoretical	  expectation	  is	  that	  
the	   complementarity	   between	   elected	   officials	   and	   administrators	   is	  modified	   to	   the	   end	  
that	  political	  power	  over	  public	  administrations	  effectively	  lessens	  due	  to	  the	  embedding	  of	  
national	  administrators	  in	  the	  EAS.	  	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  define	  measurable	  variables	  for	  the	  change	  the	  inclusion	  of	  national	  administra-­‐
tions	   in	   EU	   policy-­‐making	   entails,	   I	   will	   draw	   from	   Demir’s	   work	   on	   complementarity	   be-­‐
tween	  elected	  and	  administrative	  officials	   in	  US	   local	  government.	  To	  render	  the	  notion	  of	  
complementarity	   between	   elected	   and	   administrative	   officials	   tangible,	   the	   politics-­‐
management	  dichotomy	  is	  broken	  up	  into	  four	  constructs.	  The	  author	  measures	  the	  role	  of	  
administrators	  on	  a	  continuum	  between	  politics	  and	  policy,	   i.e.	   the	  degree	  to	  which	  public	  
administrators	  serve	  particular	  or	  technical	  objectives.	  The	  role	  of	  elected	  officials	  is,	  in	  turn,	  
measured	   on	   a	   continuum	   between	   administration	   and	  management,	   i.e.	   the	   extent	   to	  
which	  elected	  and	  appointed	  officials	  share	  governance	  responsibility	  and	  reciprocally	  influ-­‐
ence	  each	  other	  (Demir	  2009:	  877).viii	  I	  use	  the	  variables	  proposed	  by	  Demir	  to	  measure	  pol-­‐
icy	  activities	  along	  the	  two	  continua.	  The	  purpose	  is	  primarily	  to	  test	  whether	  these	  variables	  
convey	  information	  on	  changed	  state	  powers	  in	  terms	  of	  adapted	  relations	  between	  elected	  
and	  appointed	  officials,	   i.e.	  to	  get	  a	  coarse	  empirical	  overview	  on	  the	  direction	  of	  changed	  
state	  powers.	  Therefore,	  the	  following	  discussion	  centers	  on	  variables	  and	  is	  beefed	  up	  with	  
empirical	  illustrations	  on	  the	  EAS	  and	  Germany	  as	  exemplary	  member	  state.	  The	  data	  relates	  
back	  to	  the	  above	  depiction	  of	  the	  EAS	  and	  builds	  on	  some	  earlier	  comparative	  work	  as	  well	  
as	   secondary	   literature.ix	   The	   single	   case	  approach	   is	   considered	   sufficient	   to	  examine	   the	  
validity	  of	   the	  conceptual	  and	  empirical	   frameworks.	  Tables	  three	  and	  four	  summarize	  the	  
findings.	   To	   distill	   changes	   in	   the	   complementarity	   between	   political	   and	   administrative	  
realms,	  will	  discuss	  (1)	  the	  distinguishing	  complementarity	  features	  of	  the	  EAS	  at	   large,	   (2)	  
the	   impact	   on	   the	   complementarity	   variables	   in	   Germany,	   and	   (3)	   the	   interaction	   effects	  
between	   the	   national	   and	   supranational	   administrative	   action	   on	   complementarity	   of	   EU	  
policy-­‐making	  in	  general.	  
	  
Before	  moving	  on	  to	  the	  analysis,	  a	  few	  words	  on	  the	  specificities	  of	  German	  EU	  policy	  coor-­‐
dination	   are	   necessary.	   Unlike	   centralized	   states	   like	   the	   UK	   or	   France,	   the	   federal	   state	  
structure	  combined	  with	   large	  ministerial	  portfolio	  autonomy	  result	  a	  strong	   inclination	  to	  
vertical	  and	  horizontal	  fragmentation	  of	  German	  EU	  policy	  coordination.	  Vertically,	  the	  divi-­‐
sion	   of	   authority	   over	   specific	   policies	   between	   the	   federal	   (Bund)	   and	   the	   state	   (Länder)	  
levels	   is	   reproduced	   in	   the	   split	   responsibilities	   in	   EU	   coordination.	  Overall,	   “the	   constitu-­‐
tionalized	  (vertical)	  division	  of	  power	  between	  the	  federal	  level	  and	  that	  of	  the	  Länder	  leads	  
to	  a	  complex	  system	  involving	  not	  only	  a	  negotiating	  structure	  relating	  equivalent	  actors	  to	  
each	  other,	  but	  also	  relationships	  across	  the	  hierarchies	  of	  governance	  which	  prevail	  at	  each	  







level”	  (Maurer	  and	  Wessels	  2001:	  102).	  Horizontally,	  fragmentation	  is	  caused	  by	  the	  strong	  
departmental	  autonomy	  of	   the	  German	  ministerial	  bureaucracy.	  The	  core	  coordination	   re-­‐
sponsibilities	  are	  divided	  between	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  (Auswärtiges	  Amt,	  AA)	  and	  
the	  Economics	  Ministry	   (Bundesminsterium	  für	  Wirtschaft,	  BMWi).	  Notwithstanding	  the	  ul-­‐
timate	  hierarchical	  superiority	  of	  the	  Federal	  Chancellery	  (as	  for	  domestic	  cabinet	  decisions),	  
day-­‐to-­‐day	  practiced	  coordination	  between	  the	  dominant	  ministries	  appears	  often	  as	  “dou-­‐
ble-­‐tongued”	  and	  as	  cause	  for	  the	  for	  the	  structural	  fragmentation	  (Bauer,	  Knill	  et	  al.	  2007:	  
736).	  The	  division	  of	  responsibilities	  between	  the	  AA	  and	  the	  BMWi	  replicates	  the	  two-­‐tiered	  
organization	   of	   policy	   negotiation	   in	   the	   Committee	   of	   Permanent	   Representatives	  
(COREPER)	   in	   Brussels	   (Beichelt	   2007:	   425).	   The	   BMWi	   mirrors	   the	   issues	   dealt	   with	   in	  
COREPER	  I,	  which	  are	  technical	  matters	  and	  the	  bulk	  of	  economic	  and	  main	  sectoral	  EU	  poli-­‐
cies.	  The	  AA	  coordinates	  the	  political	   topics	  dealt	  with	   in	  COREPER	   II,	  namely	   institutional,	  
financial,	  and	  the	  former	  third	  and	  second	  pillar	  policies.	  A	  relevant	  feature	  of	  German	  ad-­‐
ministrative	   coordination	   in	   general	   and	   regarding	   EU	   policies	   particular	   is	   the	   “negative”	  
coordination	  style	   (Maurer	  and	  Wessels	  2001:	  102),	   though	   in	  a	  political	   context	  of	  a	  pro-­‐
nounced	  EU	  supporting	  consensus	  among	  the	  political	  elites	  (Grünhage	  2006:	  325).	  Negative	  
coordination	  focuses	  on	  cases	  of	  conflict,	  be	  it	  vertically,	  horizontally,	  political,	  institutional	  
or	   technical	  between	  different	  governmental	  departments.	  The	  dominant	   focus	  of	   conflict	  
evasion	  (instead	  of	  positive,	  proactive	  promotion	  of	  innovative	  policy	  ideas)	  is	  in	  great	  part	  
owed	  to	  the	  personnel	  structure	  and	  the	  hierarchical	  organization	  in	  which	  the	  Chancellery	  
can	   issue	  general	  guidelines	  but	  does	  not	  exercise	  a	  centralized	  coordination	   in	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  
coordination	  (Krax	  2010:	  99-­‐100).	  	  
	  
Notwithstanding	   the	   high	   fragmentation,	   Beichelt	   brands	   German	   EU	   coordination	   “over-­‐
efficient”	  due	  to	  the	  highly	  “functionally	  organised	  but	  purely	  technocratic	  preparation	  of	  EU	  
policy	  without	   the	  participation	  of	   the	  general	  public,	  political	  parties,	  and	  national	  parlia-­‐
ment”	   (Beichelt	  2007:	  421;	   see	  also:	  Derlien	  2000:	  72-­‐73).	  Applying	   the	  notion	  of	   an	   inte-­‐
grated	  EU	  administration	  to	  Germany	  highlights	  the	   inclusive	  character	  of	  the	  bureaucratic	  
procedures,	   to	  the	  point	   that	  bureaucrats	  of	  other	  member	  states	  with	  similar	  administra-­‐
tive	   systems	   consider	   the	   elaborate	  German	   coordination	   a	   technical	   support	   to	   estimate	  
the	  impact	  of	  EU	  policy	  proposals	  on	  their	  own	  national	  and	  sub-­‐national	  levels	  (Interview,	  
October	   2010).	   Reform	   attempts	   to	   increase	   efficiency	   and	   efficacy	   of	   the	   system	   have	  
largely	   lead	   to	   a	   refinement	   of	   complex	   fragmentation	   (Moore	   and	   Eppler	   2008).	   At	   the	  
same	   time,	   the	   German	   coordination	   system	   has,	   in	   administrative	   terms,	   domesticated	  
much	  of	  EU	  policy-­‐making.	  	  
	  
Table	  three	  offers	  an	  overview	  on	  the	  variables	  that	  measure	  public	  administrators’	  scores	  
on	  a	  politics	  /	  policy	  continuum.	  The	  variables	  are	  applied	  to	  the	  wider	  EAS	  and	  the	  German	  
public	   administration.	  Political	   neutrality	   (particularism	   respectively)	   denotes	   the	   political	  
end	  of	  the	  continuum.	  The	  EAS	  scores	  generally	  well,	  in	  particular	  because	  the	  multilevel	  and	  
functionally	   segmented	   division	   of	   tasks	   and	   authority	   structurally	   reduce	   the	   options	   for	  
political	   capture.	   The	  opposite	   is	   the	   case	   for	   national	   administrations	  whose	   central	   pur-­‐
pose	  becomes	   to	  promote	   the	   respective	   state	   interests.	  National	  administrators	  acting	   in	  
the	  EAS	  are	  intentionally	  deprived	  of	  a	  complete	  neutrality	  status	  to	  promote	  state-­‐centered	  
particularism.	   The	   forum	   for	   political	   neutrality	   has	   thus	   shifted	   to	   the	   supranational,	   re-­‐
flected	  in	  the	  declared	  national	  independence	  and	  collegial	  principle	  of	  the	  Commission.	  







Table	  3:	  Politics	  –	  Policy	  Continuum	  (public	  administration	  complementary	  roles)	  
	  
Ideal	  typical	  task	  
of	  administration	  
Administrators’	  
activities	  …	  	  
	  
…	  in	  the	  EAS	  	  
	  







• multiple	  political	  principals	  that	  re-­‐
duce	  political	  clout	  
• collegial	  principle	  in	  Commission	  
• agencification	  of	  administrative	  tasks	  	  
–	  
• bias	  towards	  state	  centered	  /	  
German	  particularism	  (promo-­‐
tion	  of	  member	  state	  interest	  as	  












• generally	  weak	  direct	  links	  to	  
stakeholders	  (but:	  white	  book	  on	  
governance	  strategy	  of	  Commission)	  
• agencification:	  less	  stakeholder	  in-­‐
volvement	  due	  to	  mere	  technical,	  
managerial	  nature	  of	  agencies	  	  
–	  
• complex	  and	  fragmented	  coor-­‐
dination	  makes	  it	  difficult	  for	  
stakeholders	  to	  access	  EU	  policy	  
process	  in	  German	  system	  
• time	  lack	  between	  EU	  decision-­‐
making	  and	  national	  communi-­‐





with	  society	  	  
–	  
• supranational	  administration:	  weak	  
ties	  except	  some	  very	  ,selected	  
stakeholders	  
• communication	  channeled	  largely	  
through	  national	  media	  (Koopmans	  
and	  Statham	  2010)	  
• response	  to	  increased	  politicization	  
mainly	  in	  national	  realm	  (Hooghe	  
and	  Marks	  2009)	  	  	  	  
–	  
• complex	  coordination	  process:	  
reduced	  access	  points	  for	  socie-­‐
tal	  actors	  
• system	  of	  “negative	  coordina-­‐
tion”	  (Maurer	  and	  Wessels	  
2001:	  102),	  i.e.	  merely	  focusing	  









• formally	  strong	  role	  attributed	  to	  
Commission	  (but:	  informally:	  lack	  of	  
resources	  to	  fulfill	  task,	  reliance	  on	  
external	  expertise	  	  
• state-­‐level	  administrative	  support	  
• agencification	  	  
(+)	  
• direct	  provision	  and	  reception	  of	  
information	  with	  Commission	  
(but:	  lengthy	  procedure	  may	  
lead	  to	  exclusion	  of	  German	  ex-­‐
pertise	  in	  end)	  
• division	  of	  coordination	  	  
responsibilities	  according	  to	  







officials	  in	  	  
decision-­‐
making	  	  
–	  /	  (+)	  
• formally	  low,	  goal	  setting	  preroga-­‐
tive	  of	  European	  Council,	  	  
• informally	  strong	  input	  in	  goal	  set-­‐
ting	  by	  Commission	  /	  Council	  Secre-­‐
tariat	  (but:	  depends	  on	  political	  
leadership,	  e.g.	  Delors/Barroso)	  
• weak	  administrative	  input	  in	  re-­‐
source	  allocation	  since	  stronghold	  
for	  national	  political	  influence	  	  
–	  	  
• due	  to	  complex	  coordination	  
system:	  generally	  weak	  in	  
agenda	  setting	  on	  EU	  level	  	  (but:	  
due	  to	  political	  weight	  of	  state	  
often	  option	  to	  exert	  political	  















• evaluation	  capacities	  weak	  due	  to	  
high	  dependence	  on	  implementing	  
units’	  self-­‐evaluation	  	  
• termination	  of	  policies	  highly	  politi-­‐
cal	  /	  hardly	  possible	  due	  to	  decision-­‐
making	  rules	  (Scharpf	  2006;	  Farrell	  
and	  Héritier	  2007)	  	  
–	  
• Mere	  information	  providers,	  
very	  limited	  if	  any	  bridging	  func-­‐









factual	  data	  	  
+	  /	  –	  
• formally	  strong	  role	  for	  Commission,	  
(but:	  limited	  resources	  &	  use	  exter-­‐
nal	  expertise	  (van	  Schendelen	  2006))	  	  
	  
–	  
• weak	  due	  to	  negative	  coordina-­‐
tion	  system	  that	  triggers	  no	  pro-­‐
active	  but	  only	  administrative	  
action	  if	  internal	  conflict	  	  
Source:	  own	  table	  (first	  three	  columns	  adapted	  from	  Demir	  2009)	  
	  







In	  political	  leadership	  and	  conflict	  resolution,	  defined	  as	  the	  inclusion	  of	  stakeholder	  view-­‐
points	  and	  deliberation	  with	  society,	  both	   the	  EAS	  and	  national	  administrators	   sore	  worse	  
than	   traditional	   national	   administration.	   On	   the	   supranational	   level,	   the	   Commission	   has	  
reacted	  to	  this	  in	  its	  White	  Paper	  on	  Governance	  (2001a)	  to	  promote	  both	  the	  inclusion	  of	  
societal	   actors	   and	   deliberative	   communication	   with	   citizens.	   Despite	   the	   vivid	   academic	  
attention	   to	   the	   Governance	  White	   Paper,	   this	   approach	   cannot	   overcome	   the	   structural	  
problem	  that	  political	  communication	  is	  channeled	  primarily	  through	  national	  political	  actors	  
(Koopmans	   and	   Statham	   2010).	   However,	   with	   policy-­‐making	   having	   extended	   to	   the	   EU	  
level	  combined	  with	  the	  complex	  internal	  coordination	  system,	  also	  the	  German	  federal	  and	  
state	   level	  administrations	  have	  less	  or	  no	  leeway	  for	  policy	   leadership	  and	  conflict	  resolu-­‐
tion,	  especially	  in	  the	  implementation	  phase	  because	  they	  can	  hardly	  react	  to	  implementa-­‐
tion	  failures	  directly	  by	  changing	  supranational	  rules.	  In	  the	  policy	  initiation	  and	  formulation	  
stage	  authority	  has	  clearly	  shifted	  to	  the	  Commission	  on	  the	  supranational	  level,	  as	  pointed	  
out	   above.	   Effectively,	   on	   the	   national	   level	   “neither	   the	   parliament	   nor	   the	   government	  
have	  direct	  influence	  over	  the	  setting	  of	  the	  European	  agenda”	  (Auel	  and	  Benz	  2007:	  378).	  
Given	   the	  many	   formal	   and	   informal	   administrative	   links,	   national	   administrations	   can,	   in	  
relative	  terms,	  be	  seen	  to	  have	  the	  largest	  influence	  of	  the	  national	  actors.	  Nevertheless,	  in	  
absolute	   terms	   also	   national	   administrations	   are	   rather	   weak	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   Commission’s	  
authority.	  Also	  goal	  setting	  and	  resource	  allocation	  have	  shifted	  to	  the	  EU	  level.	  Yet,	  unlike	  
policy	  initiation	  the	  setting	  of	  goals	  and	  resource	  allocation	  are	  highly	  politicized	  in	  the	  EU.	  
Whereas	  Demir	  places	   them	  closer	   to	   the	  policy	  end	  of	   the	  continuum,	   the	  negotiation	  of	  
overall	  policy	  goals	  and	  the	  multiannual	  budget	  are	  the	  most	  salient	  points	  of	  conflict	  in	  in-­‐
tergovernmental	  negotiations	  in	  the	  European	  Council.	  Formally,	  all	  administrative	  actors	  in	  
the	   EAS	   therefore	   score	   low	   (with	   a	   partial	   exception	   of	   the	   Council	   Secretariat,	   though).	  
Informally,	   the	   Commission	   does	   play	   a	   role	   in	   drafting	   overall	   guidelines,	   such	   as	   the	  
Agenda	  2020	  or	  budgetary	  proposals,	  whereas	  national	  administrations	  clearly	  play	  a	  minor	  
role.	  Both	   for	  policy	  evaluation	   and	  analysis,	   the	  Commission	   is	   formally	  endowed	  with	  a	  
key	  role,	  which	  is	  de	  facto	  weakened	  by	  the	  scarce	  resources	  to	  deliver,	  which	  makes	  it	  often	  
dependent	   on	   the	   expertise	   of	   external	   experts	   (analysis)	   or	   national	   administrations	  
(evaluation).	  The	  EAS	  and	  national	  administrations	  score	  particularly	  and	  chronically	  badly	  in	  
the	   evaluation	   of	   EU	   policies,	   for	   reasons	   discussed	   in	   connection	   to	   the	   EU	   policy	   cycle	  
above.	  Linked	  to	  its	  strong	  role	  in	  policy	  initiation,	  the	  Commission	  relies	  on	  policy	  analysis,	  
often	  provided	  by	  external	  expertise	  though.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  dominant	  style	  of	  negative	  co-­‐
ordination	   in	   Germany	   is	   geared	   heavily	   to	   detect	   potential	   vertical	   or	   horizontal	   conflict	  
that	  may	  arise	  over	  EU	  policy	  proposals.	  Negative	   coordination	   implies	  a	   systematic	  negli-­‐
gence	   of	   an	   analysis-­‐based	   and	   positive	   shaping	   role	   in	   form	   of	   providing	   information	   or	  
data.	  
	  
Summing	  up:	  how	  do	  the	  EAS	  and	  the	  German	  administration	  score,	  and	  which	  interaction	  
effects	  shape	  the	  complementarity	  between	  political	  and	  administrative	  actors?	  Overall,	  the	  
EAS	  is	  marked	  by	  a	  strong	  policy	  bias.	  It	  sores	  well	  on	  neutrality	  but	  simultaneously	  weak	  in	  
the	  politically	  glazed	  tasks	  of	  conflict	  resolution	  and	  social	  deliberation.	  This	  weak	  perform-­‐
ance	  is	  not	  only	  owed	  to	  the	  specific	  role	  of	  the	  European	  Commission	  but	  roots	  deeper	  in	  
the	  structure	  and	  functioning	  of	  the	  compound	  administrative	  system	  whose	  split	  authority	  
and	  joined	  tasks	  management	  reduce	  the	  number	  of	  direct	  contact	  points	  for	  citizens.	  With	  
respect	   to	   policy	   initiation	   and	   formulation,	   goal	   setting	   and	   resource	   allocation,	   policy	  
evaluation,	  but	  also	  the	  avoidance	  of	  particularism,	  we	  see	  a	  shift	  of	  formal	  task	  attribution	  
from	  national	   to	   supranational	   administration	  within	   the	   EAS.	  However,	   for	   all	   these	   vari-­‐
ables	  the	  very	  limited	  resources	  of	  the	  European	  Commission	  to	  fully	  complete	  these	  tasks	  







reduces	  de	  facto	  supranational	  overweight	  and	  brings	  national	  administrations	  (rather	  than	  
political	  actors!)	  back	  in.	  All	   in	  all,	  the	  strong	  bias	  of	  the	  EAS	  towards	  the	  policy	  end	  of	  the	  
continuum	  is	  not	  so	  much	  weakened	  by	  direct	  political	  interference	  but	  by	  a	  lack	  of	  adminis-­‐
trative	  resources.	  The	  German	  public	  administration	  scores	   low	  on	  basically	  all	  variables	   in	  
absolute	  terms.	  Only	  in	  policy	  initiation	  it	  scores	  better	  than	  other	  national	  political	  and	  so-­‐
cietal	  actors.	  Most	  striking	  is	  the	  intended	  particularism	  national	  administrations	  are	  set	  to	  
promote	   in	  EU	  policy-­‐making,	  which	  runs	  counter	  the	  generally	  endorsed	  neutrality	  princi-­‐
ple.	  More	  relevant	  for	  the	  hollowing	  out	  of	  core	  state	  powers	  is	  that	  the	  national	  administra-­‐
tion’s	  capacity	  for	  policy	  leadership	  and	  conflict	  resolution	  are	  reduced.	  Same	  holds	  for	  the	  
changed	   leverage	  on	   goal	   setting,	   policy	   evaluation	   and	  analysis	   –	   let	   alone	   initiative.	   The	  
policy	  bias	  of	  the	  overall	  EAS	  that	  makes	   it	  strong	  as	  a-­‐political	  policy	  oriented	  administra-­‐
tion	  implies	  thus	  that	  the	  national	  administration	  is	  deprived	  of	  potentially	  relevant	  capaci-­‐
ties	  to	  mitigate	  between	  the	  political	  and	  administrative	  realm,	  as	  normatively	  intended	  by	  
the	   complementarity	   perspective.	   Complementarity	   and	  with	   it	   a	   strong	   politics	   /	   admini-­‐
stration	  link	  on	  the	  national	  level	  is	  weakened	  due	  to	  participation	  in	  EU	  policy-­‐making.	  	  
	  
The	  second	  dimension	  focuses	  on	  elected	  officials’	  complementary	  roles	  along	  the	  admini-­‐
stration	  /	  management	  continuum.	  The	  underlying	  idea	  is	  that	  elected	  officials	  should	  ideally	  
also	   be	   involved	   in	   certain	   administrative	   processes.	   Table	   four	   summarizes	   the	   variables	  
that	  would	  all	   fall	   into	  the	  administrative	  realm	  were	  we	  to	  apply	  a	  strict	  politics	  /	  admini-­‐
stration	  dichotomy.	  The	  first	  variable	  at	  the	  administration	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum	  is	  the	  assis-­‐
tance	  and	  political	  oversight	  during	  the	  policy	  implementation.	  The	  involvement	  of	  elected	  
officials	  should	  serve	  to	  react	  directly	  on	  complaints	  or	  conflicts.	  Referring	  back	  to	  the	  illus-­‐
tration	   on	   the	   policy	   implementation	   phase	   and	   the	   peculiar	   organization	   of	   Comitology,	  
quite	   obviously	   political	   involvement	   in	   policy	   implementation	   is	   extremely	   difficult	   in	   the	  
highly	   technical	  procedure,	  even	   if	  a	   topic	  has	  high	  political	   salience.	  The	  European	  Parlia-­‐
ment	  has	   for	   long	  been	   fighting	   for	  oversight	   rights	   in	   the	  Comitology	  procedure,	  which	   it	  
has	  been	  granted	   in	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Lisbon.	  The	  new	  powers	  are	  however	   limited	  to	  ex	  ante	  
control,	   not	   least	   because	   ongoing	   control	   by	   the	   EP	   during	   the	   implementation	   phase	   is	  
basically	  impossible	  to	  realize	  in	  the	  multilevel	  framework.	  This	  situation	  is	  even	  more	  articu-­‐
lated	  when	  national	  administrators	  implement	  EU	  policies	  since	  political	  and	  administrative	  
authority	  are	  split:	  while	  the	  perceived	  responsibility	  of	  a	  policy	  decision	  is	  located	  in	  Brus-­‐
sels,	   the	  administrative	  output	   is	  delivered	  nationally,	   regionally	  or	   locally.	  Political	  actors’	  
involvement	   in	  administrative	  goal	  setting	   is	   to	  ensure	  politically	  and	  technically	  balanced	  
proposals.	  The	  EAS	  scores	  –	   intentionally	  –	  badly	  on	   this	  variable.	  First,	  multiple	  principals	  
cannot	  easily	  formulate	  clear	  preferences	  at	  this	  stage.	  Second,	  and	  more	   importantly,	  the	  
peculiar	   institutional	   setup	   in	   the	   EU	   legislative	   process	   (Majone	   2001)	   contradicts	   such	   a	  
political	   involvement	   to	   avoid	   national	   particularism	   in	   common	   initiatives.	   Notably,	   the	  
European	  Parliament	  does	  not	  even	  have	  a	  right	  to	  initiate	  legislation,	  which	  is	  a	  core	  privi-­‐
lege	   of	   parliaments	   under	   traditional	   separation	   of	   powers	   in	   democratically	   organized	  
states.	  This	  said,	  informally	  the	  Commission	  aims	  to	  accommodate	  both	  member	  state	  and	  
EP	  preferences	   in	  a	  wide	  array	  of	   informal	  procedures	  (Farrell	  and	  Héritier	  2003).	  De	  facto	  
there	  is	  political	  involvement	  but	  it	  remains	  diffuse	  and	  informal.	  Not	  much	  recognized	  but	  
little	  disputed,	  the	  Commission	  has	  moreover	  large	  discretion	  in	  issuing	  administrative	  acts	  
which	  puts	   it	   in	  the	  role	  of	  a	   legislator	   in	  areas	  of	  exclusive	  Community	  competences	  (Cini	  
2006)	  –	  basically	   free	  of	  any	  political	   involvement.	  The	  delegation	  of	   tasks	   to	   independent	  
agencies	  further	  reduces	  the	  points	  of	  reference	  for	  political	  /	  administrative	  exchange.	  	  
	  
	  







Table	  4:	  Administration	  –	  Management	  Continuum	  (political	  actors’	  complementary	  roles)	  
	  
Task	  of	  elected	  
officials	  
Political	  actors	  
involve	  in	  …	  	  
	  
…	  in	  the	  EAS	  	  
	  










• generally	  weak	  due	  to	  multiple	  prin-­‐
cipals	  and	  complexity	  of	  compound	  
system	  
• EP	  Ombudsman	  not	  integrated	  po-­‐
litical	  player	  but	  external	  oversight	  
to	  EAS	  
–	  
• implementation	  of	  EU	  policies	  
structurally	  not	  linked	  to	  strong	  
national	  oversight,	  direct	  reac-­‐
tion	  by	  national	  elected	  officials	  
hardly	  possible	  (but:	  BVerG	  



















• formally	  policy	  initiation	  prerogative	  
of	  administration,	  no	  right	  to	  initiate	  
legislation	  for	  EP	  or	  Council	  (infor-­‐
mally:	  member	  states/EP	  prefer-­‐
ences	  considered	  in	  initiatives)	  
(Farrell	  and	  Héritier	  2003;	  Ras-­‐
mussen	  2007)	  
• Commission	  as	  legislator	  	  
• Task	  delegation	  to	  agencies	  	  
	  
–	  
• strong	  bias	  for	  administrative	  
impact	  in	  fragmented	  coordina-­‐
tion	  system	  	  
• ministerial	  autonomy	  potentially	  
strengthened	  due	  to	  “Spiel	  über	  













• mainly	  administrative	  self-­‐evaluation	  	  
• ex	  ante	  and	  ex	  post	  control	  of	  Com-­‐
mission	  through	  EP	  
• 	  national	  administrative	  control	  
through	  national	  system	  (varies)	  
• agency	  oversight	  by	  Commission	  +	  
member	  states	  (latter	  dominant)	  
–	  
• compliance	  control	  by	  Commis-­‐
sion	  (not	  national	  political	  supe-­‐
rior)	  
• strengthening	  of	  executive,	  ad-­‐
ministrations	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  parlia-­‐








• since	  EAS	  complex	  administrative	  
network,	  hardly	  any	  direct	  political	  
inference	  (but:	  number	  of	  ECJ	  rul-­‐
ings)	  
+	  
• historical	  development	  of	  Ger-­‐
man	  coordination	  system	  based	  
















• generally	  the	  case	  in	  formalized	  re-­‐
cruitment	  system	  of	  Commission	  
(concours)	  (but:	  national	  quota)	  
• political	  bias	  in	  establishment	  of	  
agencies	  to	  grant	  national	  balance	  
	  
+	  
• largely	  negligence	  of	  specialized	  
EU	  qualifications	  for	  public	  ad-­‐
ministrators	  (but:	  esp.	  Länder	  
building	  up	  expertise)	  
Source:	  own	  table	  (first	  three	  columns	  adapted	  from	  Demir	  2009)	  
	  
	  
Turning	  to	  the	  national	  level,	  again	  the	  fragmented	  coordination	  system	  and	  negative	  coor-­‐
dination	  principle	  strengthen	  the	  administrative	  role	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  national	  politicians,	  but	  not	  in	  
absolute	   terms	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	  Commission	  or	  EU	  agencies.	   In	  cases	  of	  political	  deadlock	   in	  a	  
state,	  moving	  to	  the	  EU	  level	  can	  conversely	  also	  increase	  political	  leeway	  for	  sectoral	  issues	  
that	  are	  not	  decided	   in	  a	  multi-­‐sectoral	  national	  cabinet	  but	  a	   semi-­‐sectoral	  EU	  Council	  of	  
Ministers	  (“Spiel	  über	  Bande”).	  The	  greater	  leeway	  for	  ministerial	  autonomy	  can	  be	  backed	  
by	  direct	  horizontal	  contacts	  between	  administrations	  of	  various	  member	  states.	  Horizontal	  
administrative	   cooperation	   can	   hence	   support	   the	  multilevel	   venue	   shopping	   for	   political	  
decision-­‐making.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  undermines	  state-­‐internal	  coordination	  across	  sectors	  
and	  the	  portfolio	  coordination	  of	  national	  cabinets	   in	  favor	  of	  specific	  ministerial	   interests.	  
Administrative	  performance	  evaluation	  and	   improvement	   differ	   from	  policy	   evaluation	   in	  
that	  they	  focus	  on	  the	  organization	  and	  functioning	  of	  the	  administrations	  as	  such.	  Strength-­‐







ening	  political	  involvement	  aims	  at	  coordinating	  mutual	  expectations.	  For	  the	  EAS,	  the	  first	  
question	   is	   indeed	  what	  such	  mutual	  expectations	  aught	  to	  be.	  This	  quarry	  relates	  back	  to	  
the	  political	  versus	  managerial	  visions	  of	  the	  Commission	  as	  originally	  represented	  by	  Jean	  
Monnet	  and	  Coombes	  (Coombes	  1970).	  Widening	  the	  view	  to	  the	  various	  elements	  of	   the	  
EAS,	   the	   question	   itself	   becomes	   even	  more	   diffuse.	   Especially	   the	   boom	  of	   agencies	   and	  
their	  very	  design	  has	  convincingly	  been	  argued	  to	  serve	  the	  member	  states’	  objective	  to	  pre-­‐
vent	  the	  delegation	  of	  bureaucratic	  power	  to	  the	  Commission	  (Tarrant	  and	  Kelemen	  2007).	  A	  
landmark	  constitutional	  change	  towards	  the	  definition	  of	  administrative	  performance	  stan-­‐
dards	  was	  the	  ratification	  of	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Lisbon	  that	  renders	  the	  Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  
Rights	   legally	   binding.	   The	   Charter	   includes	   the	   “right	   to	   good	   administration”	   (Art.	   14),	  
which	  “is	  based	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  upon	  existing	  principles	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  EU	  treaties,	  leg-­‐
islation	  and	  case-­‐law,	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  balance	  subjective	  rights	  of	  individuals	  and	  the	  general	  
interest	  of	  society	  in	  having	  an	  efficient	  administration	  embedded	  in	  the	  respect	  of	  the	  rule	  
of	  Law”	  (Ziller	  2008:	  7).	  The	  rights	  relate	  to	  the	  corollary	  rights	  to	  access	  EU	  documents,	  to	  
refer	  to	  the	  EU	  Ombudsman,	  and	  to	  effective	  remedy	  and	  fair	  trial.	  The	  positive	  formulation	  
of	  good	  administration	  as	  principle	  is,	  however,	  still	  to	  be	  filled	  with	  more	  concrete	  meaning	  
in	  the	  policy	  process,	  which	  will	  more	  likely	  be	  defined	  by	  the	  ECJ	  and	  not	  political	  /	  adminis-­‐
trative	  cooperation.	  An	  empirical	   indication	  of	  how	  expectations	  are	  handled	  are	  the	  Com-­‐
mission	  reforms,	  most	  importantly	  the	  Kinnock	  reform	  that	  was	  pushed	  for	  by	  the	  Commis-­‐
sion	   itself	  with	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  political	  perspectives	  entering	  mainly	   informally	  (Kinnock	  
2004).	  As	  mentioned	  before,	  short	  of	  clear-­‐cut	  objectives	  about	  the	  Commission’s	  role,	  the	  
member	  states’	  most	  effective	  means	  to	  exert	  political	  power	   is	  to	  keep	  the	  Commission’s	  
resources	   limited.	   Additionally,	   the	   EP	   has	   emerged	   as	   an	   important	   control	   body	   of	   the	  
Commission.	  But	   since	   the	  actual	   control	   instruments	  are	  extremely	  harsh	   (rejection	  of	  an	  
appointed	   Commission	   President,	   or	   demission	   of	   the	  whole	   College),	   these	   control	   func-­‐
tions	  do	  not	  really	  promote	  mutual	  expectations	  management	  but	  rather	  a	  confrontational	  
control	   relationship.x	   In	   short,	   a	   cooperative	   political	   /	   administrative	   coordination	   of	   ex-­‐
pected	  administrative	  performance	  of	  the	  EAS	   is	  hardly	  realizable	  due	  to	  the	  multiple	  ven-­‐
ues,	  forms	  of	  administrative	  actions,	  political	  principals	  –	  and	  above	  all,	  the	  underspecified	  
definition	  of	   “good	  administrative	  performance”	  even	  of	   the	  Commission.xi	   Turning	   to	   the	  
German	   case,	   independent	   of	   the	   degree	   to	   which	   mutual	   expectations	   are	   coordinated	  
within	  the	  ministerial	  bureaucracy	  in	  general,	  participation	  in	  the	  EAS	  decreases	  the	  options	  
for	  such	  political	  /	  administrative	  links.	  The	  systematic	  difference	  of	  EU	  compared	  to	  purely	  
national	   policy-­‐making	   is	   that	   the	   Commission	   becomes	   a	   political	   superior	   that	   controls	  
compliance	  and	  the	  implementation	  of	  EU	  law	  (bottom	  right	  boxes,	  Table	  1	  and	  2).	  Hence,	  
performance	  goals	  also	  have	  to	  match	  supranational	  standards	  which	  are,	  however,	  mostly	  
delegated	  top-­‐down	  from	  the	  Commission	  to	  the	  national	  administrations	  in	  administrative	  
ordinances.	  Finally,	  the	  EAS	  and	  the	  German	  national	  administration	  score	  fairly	  well	  on	  or-­‐
ganizational	   coordination	   and	  personnel	  management	  at	   the	  managerial	  end	  of	   the	  scale,	  
even	  if	  for	  different	  reasons.	  Quite	  obviously,	  given	  the	  compound	  and	  policy-­‐driven	  nature	  
of	   the	   EAS,	   political	   inference	   is,	   overall,	   low.	   Looking	   at	   the	   constituent	   elements,	   the	  
Commission’s	  organization	  is	  indeed	  highly	  independent	  while	  the	  driving	  idea	  of	  delegating	  
tasks	  to	  agencies	  is	  precisely	  to	  increase	  independence.	  Policy	  coordination	  in	  Germany	  has	  
historically	  grown	  as	  response	  to	  administrative	  demands	  rather	  than	  political	  interference.	  
An	  exception	  was	  the	  move	  of	  coordination	  functions	  from	  the	  ministry	  of	  economics	  to	  that	  
of	  finance	  under	  the	  first	  Schröder	  cabinet	  in	  order	  to	  increase	  the	  weight	  of	  the	  minister	  of	  
finance’s	  portfolio.	  This	  move	  has,	  however,	  been	  reversed	  after	  the	  demission	  of	  that	  very	  
minister.	  As	   far	  as	  administrative	   staff	   is	   concerned,	  personnel	  management	   in	   the	  EAS	   is	  
based	  on	  a	  merit	  system	  and	  especially	  the	  entry	  into	  the	  EU	  Commission	  is	  organized	  by	  a	  







formalized	  procedure	  of	  examination.	  Yet,	  for	  the	  Commission	  as	  other	  EU	  institutions	  for-­‐
mal	  or	  informal	  country	  quotas	  apply.	  Personal	  management	  in	  German	  EU	  coordination	  has	  
for	   long	  not	  been	  an	  issue	  since	  personnel	  was	  simply	   integrated	  into	  and	  recruited	  out	  of	  
the	  ministerial	  bureaucracy.	  A	  changed	  and	  more	  strategic	  approach	  that	  takes	  account	  of	  
the	   increased	   relevance	   of	   EU	   decisions	   can	   be	   observed	   in	   some	   instances.	   Some	   of	   the	  
Länder	  administrations	  have	  however	  begun	  to	  build	  up	  specialized	  EU	  expertise.	  For	  exam-­‐
ple,	  Saxony	  has	  introduced	  a	  “EU	  pool”	  that	  provides	  funds	  for	  Länder-­‐level	  bureaucrats	  to	  
be	   seconded	   to	   either	   the	   Brussels	   office	   or	   the	   coordination	   unit	   of	   the	   foreign	   office.	  
Choosing	  a	  different	  approach,	  the	  Land	  of	  Hesse	  has	  started	  a	  “EU	  trainee”	  program	  to	  built	  
up	  EU	  related	  expertise	  of	  selected	  officials.	  These	  approaches	  reflect	  the	   increased	  atten-­‐
tion	   also	   on	   the	   Länder	   level	   on	   administrative	   competences	   to	   participate	   in	   EU	   policy-­‐
making	  (Interview,	  2010).	  
	  
Recapitulating	  the	  findings:	  the	  EAS	  in	  its	  whole	  is	  to	  be	  placed	  much	  more	  at	  the	  managerial	  
than	  the	  administrative	  end.	  This	  results	  in	  great	  parts	  from	  the	  overall	  institutional	  architec-­‐
ture	  of	   the	  EU.	  Equally	   important	   is	   the	   fact	   that	  multiple	  political	   actors	  act	   as	  principals	  
across	  the	  levels	  of	  the	  polity,	  which	  obliterates	  political	  clout	  not	  least	  because	  these	  actors	  
come	  from	  very	  different	  administrative	  cultures	  and	  traditions	  that	  shape	  their	  preferences.	  
German	   administration	   in	   the	   context	   of	   EU	   policy-­‐making	   runs	   generally	   parallel	   to	   this.	  
Notably,	  this	  is	  in	  great	  parts	  explained	  by	  the	  general	  principles	  underpinning	  German	  pub-­‐
lic	  administration.	  Yet,	  particularly	  in	  the	  case	  of	  performance	  evaluation	  and	  improvement,	  
as	  well	  as	  policy	  implementation,	  the	  additional	  EU	  layer	  has	  drawn	  capacities	  from	  the	  na-­‐
tional	  political	  realm	  to	  the	  supranational	  authorities.	  To	  a	  lesser	  degree,	  this	  applies	  also	  to	  
administrative	  goal	   setting.	  On	   the	  whole	   the	  EAS	  structurally	   lifts	   the	  hurdles	   for	  political	  
involvement	  in	  administration	  and	  management	  tasks.	  
Conclusions:  Depicting and Explaining State and Functioning of the EAS 
 
This	  paper	  started	  from	  the	  fundamental	  claim	  that	  public	  administrations	  are	  central	  play-­‐
ers	   in	  the	  policy	  process,	  and	  hence	  that	  the	  control	  over	  and	  organization	  of	  civil	  services	  
are	  core	  state	  powers.	  The	  central	  questions	  asked	  were	  accordingly:	  which	  administrative	  
system	   underpins	   EU	   policy-­‐making;	   and	   which	   consequences	   does	   participation	   in	   the	  
European	  Administrative	  Space	  entail	  for	  the	  autonomy	  of	  national	  bureaucracies?	  	  
	  
Answering	   the	   first	  of	   the	   two	  queries,	   I	  developed	  a	   conceptual	   framework	   to	  depict	   the	  
EAS	  as	  a	  policy-­‐driven,	  compound,	  and	  multilevel	  administration.	  Taking	  a	  public	  policy	  an-­‐
gle,	   the	   EAS	   is	   systematically	   described	   by	   delineating	   the	   administrative	   tasks,	   authority,	  
instruments	   and	   actor	   constellations	   it	   operates	   on.	   This	   approach	   allows	   drawing	   a	   clear	  
analytical	  picture	  of	  the	  complex	  administrative	  space	  that	  falls	  short	  of	  unitary	  institutions	  
in	   form	   of	   formalized	   harmonizing.	   This	   analytical	   description	   therefore	   renders	   the	   EAS	  
comparable	   to	   other	   public	   administrations.	  Moreover,	   the	   analytical	   framework	   offers	   a	  
template	  to	  describe	  other	  multilevel	  administrative	  compounds	  in	  international	  policy	  mak-­‐
ing.	  The	  theoretical	  innovation	  is	  the	  definition	  of	  categories	  that	  are	  systematically	  derived	  
from	   administrative	   practices	   in	   order	   to	   overcome	   the	   theoretical	   problem	  we	   are	   faced	  
with	  when	  describing	  systems	  that	  develop	  in	  the	  intentional	  absence	  of	  a	  planned	  institu-­‐
tional	  design	  of	  the	  administrative	  architecture.	  	  
	  







The	  second	  challenge	  dealt	  with	  was	  the	  empirical	  measurement	  of	  the	   impact	  which	  par-­‐
ticipation	  in	  a	  compound	  multilevel	  system	  has	  on	  national	  public	  administrations.	  Drawing	  
on	  the	  complementarity	  view	  in	  public	  administrative	  research,	  I	  applied	  variables	  that	  cap-­‐
ture	  the	  intersection	  between	  the	  political	  and	  administrative	  realms	  to	  the	  EAS	  at	  large,	  and	  
the	  German	  national	  administration	  more	  narrowly.	  The	  findings	  add	  to	  our	  understanding	  
of	   the	   EAS,	   the	   national	   civil	   services	   in	   supranational	   policy-­‐making,	   and	   the	   analysis	   of	  
complementarity	  more	  generally.	  Firstly,	  the	  EAS	  emerges	  as	  strongly	  policy-­‐oriented	  with	  a	  
managerial	  focus	  and	  with	  very	  limited	  scope	  to	  integrate	  political	  and	  wider	  administrative	  
objectives.	   Applying	   a	   politics	   /	   administration	   dichotomy,	   the	   EAS	   hence	   seems	   to	   fare	  
rather	  well	  at	  first	  sight.	  Scrutinizing	  the	  single	  variables	  more	  thoroughly,	  it	  shows	  however	  
that	  administrative	  independence	  is	  paired	  with	  insufficient	  resources	  and	  concentration	  of	  
authority.	   In	   consequence,	   the	   Commission	   is	   not	   the	   central	   independent	   administrative	  
actor	   it	   formally	   suggests	   to	   be.	   Instead,	   the	   joint	   execution	  of	   task	   and	   split	   of	   authority	  
along	  vertical	  and	  functional	   lines	  reduces	  de	  facto	  both	  political	  oversight	  and	  administra-­‐
tive	  independence.	  Secondly,	  the	  participation	  in	  the	  EAS	  renders	  the	  German	  national	  ad-­‐
ministration	  more	  policy-­‐oriented	  with	  respect	  direct	  interactions	  with	  citizens.	  At	  the	  same	  
time	  it	  loses	  neutrality	  because	  its	  central	  purpose	  is	  the	  promotion	  of	  national	  interests	  in	  
the	  EU	  policy	  process.	  Core	  state	  powers	  are	  affected	  in	  various	  ways,	  the	  most	  striking	  are:	  
the	   negative	   German	   coordination	   system	   and	   shift	   of	   policy	   formulation	   powers	   to	   the	  
Commission	   reduce	   the	   possibility	   to	   feed	   policy	   analyses	   into	   the	   policy	   process,	   policy	  
implementation	   on	   the	   ground	   is	   based	   on	   administrators’	   direct	   contacts	   to	   Brussels	  
(largely	  exclusion	  of	  national	  political	  actors),	  political	  oversight	  is	  shared	  with	  supranational	  
organizations	   (mainly	   the	   Commission),	   and	   horizontal	   state-­‐to-­‐state	   administrative	   coop-­‐
eration	   to	   push	   a	   sectoral	   issue	   onto	   the	   EU	   agenda	   can	   undermine	   the	   national	   inter-­‐
ministerial	  coordination	  (“Spiel	  über	  Bande”).	  Thirdly,	  these	  findings	  support	  the	  validity	  of	  
the	  applying	  complementarity	  variables	   in	  order	   to	  measure	   the	  effect	  of	  multilevel	  policy	  
making	   on	   public	   administrations.	   Although	   the	   paper’s	  main	   focus	  was	   not	   an	   elaborate	  
empirical	   study,	   the	   results	   reveal	   a	   great	   amount	   of	   indicative	   information	   that	   call	   for	  
further,	  more	  refined	  and	  comparative	  empirical	  research	  to	  uncover	  in	  more	  depth	  how	  the	  
EAS	  /	  national	  public	  administration	  interactions	  play	  out	  in	  different	  administrative	  systems.	  	  
	  
In	  conclusion,	  the	  conceptual	  and	  empirical	  results	  have	  normative	  implications	  that	  should	  
not	  go	  unnoticed,	  in	  particular	  because	  the	  complementarity	  view	  rests	  on	  strong	  normative	  
grounds.	  Even	  though	  the	  strengthening	  of	  policy-­‐orientation	  and	  a	  managerial	  bias	  both	  in	  
the	  wider	   EAS	   and	   on	   the	  more	   confined	   national	   level	   appear	   to	   support	   administrative	  
neutrality,	   it	   has	   been	   shown	   that	   this	   is	   not	   necessarily	   the	   case.	  With	   EU	   policy-­‐making	  
becoming	  gradually	  more	  politicized	  (Hooghe	  and	  Marks	  2009;	  Kriesi,	  Grande	  et	  al.	  2008)	  a	  
gap	   between	   political	   and	   bureaucratic	   governance	   can	   bare	   severe	   dangers	   because	   civil	  
services	  lose	  their	  capacity	  to	  offer	  direct	  contact	  points	  for	  citizens	  and	  the	  crucial	  capacity	  
to	  mitigate	  between	  the	  policy	  process,	  politics	  and	  people.	  
	  










Aberbach,	  J.	  D.,	  Putnam,	  R.	  D.	  and	  Rockman,	  B.	  A.	  (1981)	  Bureaucrats	  and	  Politicians	  in	  
Western	  Democracies	  (Cambridge,	  MA	  (USA)	  /	  London:	  Harvard	  University	  Press)	  	  
Auel,	  K.	  and	  Benz,	  A.	  (2007)	  'Democratic	  Accountability	  and	  National	  Parliaments:	  Redefining	  
the	  Impact	  of	  Parliamentary	  Scrutiny	  in	  EU	  Affairs'.	  European	  Law	  Journal	  Vol.	  13:	  4,	  
pp.	  487-­‐504.	  
Balint,	  T.,	  Bauer,	  M.	  W.	  and	  Knill,	  C.	  (2008)	  'Bureaucratic	  Change	  in	  the	  European	  Adminis-­‐
trative	  Space:	  The	  Case	  of	  the	  European	  Commission'.	  West	  European	  Politics	  Vol.	  31:	  
4,	  pp.	  677-­‐700.	  
Bauer,	  M.	  W.,	  Knill,	  C.	  and	  Ziegler,	  M.	  (2007)	  'Optimierung	  deutscher	  Ministerialkoordination	  
in	  EU-­‐Angelegenheiten.	  Folgerungen	  aus	  einem	  Leistungsvergleich	  institutioneller	  Ar-­‐
rangements	  in	  Deutschland,	  Finnland	  und	  Großbritannien'.	  Zeitschrift	  für	  Parlaments-­‐
fragen	  Vol.	  38:	  4,	  pp.	  737-­‐54.	  
Beichelt,	  T.	  (2007)	  'Over-­‐efficiency	  in	  German	  EU	  Policy	  Coordination'.	  German	  Politics	  Vol.	  
16:	  4,	  pp.	  421-­‐33.	  
Bossaert,	  D.,	  Demmke,	  C.,	  Nomden,	  K.,	  Polet,	  R.	  and	  Auer,	  A.	  (2001)	  Civil	  Services	  in	  the	  
European	  of	  Fifteen:	  Trends	  and	  New	  Developments	  (Maastricht:	  EIPA)	  	  
Brady,	  H.	  (2008)	  'Europol	  and	  the	  European	  Criminal	  Intelligence	  Model:	  A	  Non-­‐state	  Re-­‐
sponse	  to	  Organized	  Crime'.	  Policing	  Vol.	  2:	  1,	  pp.	  103-­‐09.	  
Cardona,	  F.	  (1999)	  'European	  Principles	  for	  Public	  Administration'.	  	  SIGMA	  Papers:	  No.	  27:	  
CCNM/SIGMA/PUMA(99)44/REV1.	  	  
Chiti,	  M.	  P.	  (2004)	  'Forms	  of	  European	  Administrative	  Action'.	  Law	  and	  Contemporary	  Prob-­‐
lems	  Vol.	  68:	  1,	  pp.	  37-­‐57.	  
Christiansen,	  T.	  (2006)	  'Out	  of	  the	  Shadows:	  The	  General	  Secretariat	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Minis-­‐
ters'.	  Journal	  of	  Legislative	  Studies	  Vol.	  8:	  4,	  pp.	  80-­‐97.	  
Cini,	  M.	  (2006)	  'The	  European	  Commission:	  An	  Unelected	  Legislator?'.	  Journal	  of	  Legislative	  
Studies	  Vol.	  8:	  4,	  pp.	  14-­‐26.	  
Commission	  of	  the	  European	  Communities	  (2001a)	  'European	  Governance'.	  A	  White	  Paper	  
Vol.	  Brussels,	  25.7.2001:	  COM(2001)	  428	  final.	  
Commission	  of	  the	  European	  Communities	  (2001b)	  'Services	  of	  General	  Interests	  in	  Europe:	  
Communication	  from	  the	  Commission'.	  Official	  Journal	  of	  the	  European	  Communities	  
Vol.	  C	  17/4:	  19.	  January.	  
Commission	  of	  the	  European	  Communities	  (2006)	  'Strengthening	  Institutional	  Capacity	  and	  
Efficiency	  of	  Public	  Administrations	  and	  Public	  Services	  in	  the	  Next	  Programming	  Pe-­‐
riod	  (2007-­‐2013)'.	  	  DG	  Employment	  Social	  Affairs	  and	  Equal	  Opportunities:	  	  
<http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/esf2000/pdf/institutional_capacity_en.pdf>	  
(Accessed	  on:	  1	  April	  2007).	  
Coombes,	  D.	  (1970)	  Politics	  and	  bureaucracy	  in	  the	  European	  Community:	  A	  Portrait	  of	  the	  
Commission	  of	  the	  E.E.C	  (London:	  George	  Allen	  &	  Unwin)	  	  
Craig,	  P.	  (2006)	  EU	  Administrative	  Law	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press)	  	  
deLeon,	  P.	  (1999)	  'The	  Stages	  Approach	  to	  the	  Policy	  Process:	  What	  Has	  It	  Done?	  Where	  Is	  It	  
Going?'.	  In:	  Sabatier,	  P.	  A.	  (ed.)	  Theories	  of	  Policy	  Processes	  (Boulder	  (Col.):	  Westeview	  
Press),	  pp.	  19-­‐32.	  







Demir,	  T.	  (2009)	  'The	  Complementarity	  View:	  Exploring	  a	  Continuum	  in	  Political—
Administrative	  Relations'.	  Public	  Administration	  Review	  Vol.	  69:	  5,	  pp.	  876-­‐88.	  
Demir,	  T.	  and	  Nyhan,	  R.	  C.	  (2008)	  'The	  Politics–Administration	  Dichotomy:	  An	  Empirical	  
Search	  for	  Correspondence	  between	  Theory	  and	  Practice'.	  Public	  Administration	  Re-­‐
view	  Vol.	  68:	  1,	  pp.	  81-­‐96.	  
Derlien,	  H.-­‐U.	  (2000)	  'Germany:	  Failing	  Successfully?'.	  In:	  Kassim,	  H.,	  Menon,	  A.,	  Peters,	  B.	  G.	  
and	  Wright,	  V.	  (eds.)	  The	  National	  Co-­‐ordination	  of	  EU	  Policy:	  The	  Domestic	  Level	  (Ox-­‐
ford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press),	  pp.	  54-­‐78.	  
Dimitrakopoulous,	  D.	  and	  Richardson,	  J.	  (2001)	  'Implementing	  EU	  Public	  Policy'.	  In:	  
Richardson,	  J.	  (ed.)	  European	  Union:	  Power	  and	  Policy-­‐making	  (London:	  Routledge),	  
pp.	  335-­‐56.	  
Egeberg,	  M.	  (2002)	  'The	  European	  Commission	  -­‐	  The	  Evolving	  EU	  Executive'.	  	  ARENA:	  WP	  
02/30.	  <http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp02_30.htm>	  (Accessed	  on:	  20	  July	  
2003).	  
Egeberg,	  M.	  and	  Trondal,	  J.	  (2007)	  'National	  Agencies	  in	  the	  European	  Administrative	  Space:	  
Government	  Driven,	  Commission	  Driven,	  or	  Networked?'.	  In:	  Egeberg,	  M.	  (ed.)	  Institu-­‐
tional	  Dynamics	  and	  the	  Transformation	  of	  Executive	  Politics	  in	  Europe	  (Mannheim:	  
CONNEX	  Report	  Series	  Nr	  03),	  pp.	  291-­‐311.	  
Egeberg,	  M.	  and	  Trondal,	  J.	  (2009a)	  'National	  Agencies	  in	  the	  European	  Administrative	  
Space:	  Government	  Driven,	  Commission	  Driven	  or	  Networked?'.	  Public	  Administration	  
Vol.	  87:	  4,	  pp.	  779-­‐90.	  
Egeberg,	  M.	  and	  Trondal,	  J.	  (2009b)	  'Political	  Leadership	  and	  Bureaucratic	  Autonomy:	  Effects	  
of	  Agencification'.	  	  ARENA	  Working	  Paper	  Series:	  09/2009.	  
<http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/working-­‐papers2009/papers/WP09_09.xml>	  
(Accessed	  on:	  31	  August	  2009).	  
Farrell,	  H.	  and	  Héritier,	  A.	  (2003)	  'Formal	  and	  Informal	  Institutions	  Under	  Codecision:	  Con-­‐
tinuous	  Constitution-­‐Building	  in	  Europe'.	  Governance:	  An	  International	  Journal	  of	  Pol-­‐
icy,	  Administration,	  and	  Institutions	  Vol.	  16:	  4,	  pp.	  577-­‐600.	  
Farrell,	  H.	  and	  Héritier,	  A.	  (2007)	  'Introduction:	  Contested	  Competences	  in	  the	  European	  
Union'.	  West	  European	  Politics	  Vol.	  30:	  2,	  pp.	  227-­‐43.	  
Grünhage,	  J.	  (2006)	  Entscheidungsprozesse	  in	  der	  Europapolitik	  Deutschlands:	  Von	  Konrad	  
Adenauer	  bis	  Gerhard	  Schröder	  (Baden-­‐Baden:	  Nomos)	  	  
Heidbreder,	  E.	  G.	  (2011)	  'Structuring	  the	  European	  Administrative	  Space:	  Policy	  Instruments	  
of	  Multi-­‐level	  Administration'.	  Journal	  of	  European	  Public	  Policy	  Vol.	  18:	  5.	  
Hill,	  C.	  (ed.)	  (1996)	  The	  Actors	  in	  European	  Foreign	  Policy	  (London:	  Routledge).	  
Hofmann,	  A.	  and	  Türk,	  A.	  (2006)	  EU	  Administrative	  Governance	  (Cheltenham,	  UK	  /	  North-­‐
ampton	  M.A.,	  USA:	  Edward	  Elgar)	  	  
Hofmann,	  H.	  C.	  H.	  (2008)	  'Mapping	  the	  European	  Administrative	  Space'.	  West	  European	  Poli-­‐
tics	  Vol.	  31:	  4,	  pp.	  662-­‐76.	  
Hofmann,	  H.	  C.	  H.	  and	  Türk,	  A.	  (2007)	  'The	  Development	  of	  Integrated	  Administration	  in	  the	  
EU	  and	  its	  Consequences'.	  European	  Law	  Journal	  Vol.	  13:	  2,	  pp.	  253-­‐71.	  
Hooghe,	  L.	  and	  Marks,	  G.	  (2009)	  'A	  Postfunctionalist	  Theory	  of	  European	  Integration:	  From	  
Permissive	  Consensus	  to	  Constraining	  Dissensus'.	  British	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Science	  
Vol.	  39:	  1,	  pp.	  1-­‐23.	  
Howlett,	  M.	  and	  Ramesh,	  M.	  (2003)	  Studying	  Public	  Policy:	  Policy	  Cycles	  and	  Policy	  Subsys-­‐
tems	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press)	  (2nd	  edition).	  
Kinnock,	  N.	  (2004)	  'Reforming	  the	  European	  Commission:	  Organisational	  Challenges	  and	  
Advances'.	  Public	  Policy	  and	  Administration	  Vol.	  19:	  3,	  pp.	  7-­‐12.	  







Koopmans,	  R.	  and	  Statham,	  P.	  (eds.)	  (2010)	  The	  Making	  of	  a	  European	  Public	  Sphere:	  Media	  
Discourse	  and	  Political	  Contention	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press).	  
Krax,	  M.	  (2010)	  Nationalstaatliche	  Koordination	  der	  europapolitischen	  Willensbildung:	  
Politikformulierung	  in	  Deutschland,	  Frankreich	  und	  dem	  Vereinigten	  Königreich	  im	  Ver-­‐
gleich	  (Opladen:	  Barbara	  Budrich)	  	  
Kriesi,	  H.,	  Grande,	  E.,	  Lachat,	  R.,	  Dolezal,	  M.,	  Bornschier,	  S.	  and	  Frey,	  T.	  (2008)	  West	  Euro-­‐
pean	  Politics	  in	  the	  Age	  of	  Globalization	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press)	  	  
Lascoumes,	  P.	  and	  Le	  Gales,	  P.	  (2007)	  'Introduction:	  Understanding	  Public	  Policy	  through	  Its	  
Instruments—From	  the	  Nature	  of	  Instruments	  to	  the	  Sociology	  of	  Public	  Policy	  Instru-­‐
mentation'.	  Governance	  Vol.	  20:	  1,	  pp.	  1-­‐21.	  
Levy,	  R.	  P.	  (2004)	  'Between	  Rhetoric	  and	  Reality:	  Implementing	  Management	  Reform	  in	  the	  
European	  Commission'.	  International	  Journal	  of	  Public	  Sector	  Management	  Vol.	  17:	  2,	  
pp.	  166-­‐77.	  
Lynn,	  L.	  E.	  J.	  (2001)	  'The	  Myth	  of	  the	  Bureaucratic	  Paradigm:	  What	  Traditional	  Public	  Admini-­‐
stration	  Really	  Stood	  For'.	  Public	  Administration	  Review	  Vol.	  61:	  2,	  pp.	  144-­‐60.	  
Majone,	  G.	  (1996)	  Regulating	  Europe	  (London:	  Routledge)	  	  
Majone,	  G.	  (2001)	  'Regulatory	  Legitimacy	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  European	  Union'.	  In:	  
Nicolaïdis,	  K.	  and	  Howse,	  R.	  (eds.)	  The	  Federal	  Vision:	  Legitimacy	  and	  Levels	  of	  Govern-­‐
ance	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  European	  Union	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press),	  
pp.	  252-­‐74.	  
Mangenot,	  M.	  (ed.)	  (2005)	  Public	  Administrations	  and	  Services	  of	  General	  Interest:	  What	  
Kind	  of	  Europeanisation?	  (Maastricht:	  European	  Institute	  of	  Public	  Administration).	  
Maurer,	  A.	  and	  Wessels,	  W.	  (2001)	  'The	  German	  Case:	  A	  Key	  Motor	  in	  a	  Cmpetitive	  Multi-­‐
level	  Environment'.	  In:	  Kassim,	  H.,	  Menon,	  A.,	  Peters,	  B.	  G.	  and	  Wright,	  V.	  (eds.)	  The	  
National	  Co-­‐ordination	  of	  EU	  Policy:	  The	  European	  Level	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  
Press),	  pp.	  101-­‐28.	  
Moore,	  C.	  and	  Eppler,	  A.	  (2008)	  'Disentangling	  Double	  Politikverflechtung?	  The	  Implications	  
of	  the	  Federal	  Reforms	  for	  Bund-­‐Lnder	  Relations	  on	  Europe'.	  German	  Politics	  Vol.	  17:	  
4,	  pp.	  488-­‐508.	  
Nizzo,	  C.	  (2001)	  'National	  Public	  Administrations	  and	  European	  Integration'.	  	  SIGMA:	  	  
<http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/nispacee/unpan007286.pd
f>	  (Accessed	  on:	  14	  March	  2009).	  
Olsen,	  J.	  (2003)	  'Towards	  a	  European	  Administrative	  Space?'.	  Journal	  of	  European	  Public	  Pol-­‐
icy	  Vol.	  10:	  4,	  pp.	  506-­‐31.	  
Olsen,	  J.	  P.	  (2007)	  Europe	  in	  Search	  of	  Political	  Order:	  An	  Institutional	  Perspective	  on	  
Unity/Diversity,	  Citizens/Their	  Helpers,	  Democratic	  Design/Historical	  Drift,	  and	  the	  Co-­‐
existence	  of	  Orders	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press)	  	  
Overeem,	  P.	  (2001)	  'Beyond	  Heterodoxy:	  Dwight	  Waldo	  and	  the	  Politics-­‐	  Administration	  Di-­‐
chotomy'.	  Public	  Administration	  Review	  Vol.	  68:	  1,	  pp.	  36-­‐45.	  
Peters,	  B.	  G.	  and	  Wright,	  V.	  (2001)	  'The	  National	  Co-­‐ordination	  of	  European	  Policy-­‐making:	  
Negotiating	  the	  Quagmire'.	  In:	  Richardson,	  J.	  (ed.)	  European	  Union:	  Power	  and	  Policy-­‐
making	  (Abingdon:	  Routledge),	  pp.	  155-­‐78.	  
Pollak,	  J.	  and	  Puntscher	  Riekmann,	  S.	  (2008)	  'European	  Administration:	  Centralisation	  and	  
Fragmentation	  as	  Means	  of	  Polity-­‐building?'.	  West	  European	  Politics	  Vol.	  31:	  4,	  pp.	  
771-­‐88.	  
Pollitt,	  C.	  and	  Bouckaert,	  G.	  (2004)	  Pulic	  Management	  Reform:	  A	  Comparative	  Analysis	  (Ox-­‐
ford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press)	  (2nd).	  







Rasmussen,	  A.	  (2007)	  'Challenging	  the	  Commission's	  right	  of	  initiative?	  Conditions	  for	  insti-­‐
tutional	  change	  and	  stability'.	  West	  European	  Politics	  Vol.	  30:	  2,	  pp.	  244-­‐64.	  
Scharpf,	  F.	  (2006)	  'The	  Joint-­‐Decision	  Trap	  Revisited'.	  Journal	  of	  Common	  Market	  Studies	  Vol.	  
44:	  4,	  pp.	  845-­‐64.	  
Shapiro,	  M.	  (2004)	  'The	  Institutionalization	  of	  European	  Administrative	  Space'.	  	  eScholarship	  
Repository:	  wps-­‐2000-­‐09.	  <http://repositories.cdlib.org/iir/ccop/wps-­‐2000-­‐09>	  (Ac-­‐
cessed	  on:	  20	  September	  2009).	  
Siedentopf,	  H.	  and	  Speer,	  B.	  (2003)	  'The	  European	  Administrative	  Space	  from	  a	  German	  Ad-­‐
ministrative	  Science	  Perspective'.	  International	  Review	  of	  Administrative	  Science	  Vol.	  
89:	  1,	  pp.	  9-­‐28.	  
Svara,	  J.	  H.	  (2001)	  'The	  Myth	  of	  the	  Dichotomy:	  Complementarity	  of	  Politics	  and	  Administra-­‐
tion	  in	  the	  Past	  and	  Future	  of	  Public	  Administration'.	  Public	  Administration	  Review	  Vol.	  
61:	  2,	  pp.	  176-­‐83.	  
Sydow,	  G.	  (2004)	  Verwaltungskooperation	  in	  der	  Europäischen	  Union:	  Zur	  horizontalen	  und	  
vertikalen	  Zusammenarbeit	  der	  europäischen	  Verwaltungen	  am	  Beispiel	  des	  Produktzu-­‐
lassungsrechts	  (Tübingen:	  Mohr	  Siebeck)	  	  
Tarrant,	  A.	  and	  Kelemen,	  D.	  R.	  (2007)	  'Building	  the	  Eurocracy:	  The	  Politics	  of	  EU	  Agencies	  and	  
Networks'.	  Paper	  Prepared	  for	  the	  Biennial	  European	  Union	  Studies	  Association	  Con-­‐
vention	  Vol.	  Montréal,	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  Secretariat	  (officially:	  General	  Secretariat	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  the	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  has	  assists	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  in	  implementing	  its	  annual	  program,	  it	  provides	  the	  
secretariat	   for	   Intergovernmental	  Conferences,	  and	   it	  coordinates	  the	   intergovernmental	  organized	  
Common	  Foreign	  and	  Security	  Policy.	  Depending	  on	  experience	  and	  choice	  of	  the	  country	  holding	  the	  
rotating	  Council	  presidency,	  the	  Secretariat	  can	  play	  a	  major	  role.	  The	  omission	  is	  however	  justified	  
by	  the	   less	  prominent	  role	  of	  the	  Secretariat	   in	  the	  policy	  process	  –	   in	  contrast	  to	  major	  Treaty	  re-­‐
forms	   (Christiansen	   2006).	  Moreover,	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	   permanent	   president	   of	   the	   Council	  
might	  also	  increase	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Secretariat	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  Commission.	  At	  date,	  it	  is	  still	  to	  early	  to	  
judge	  to	  which	  extent	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty	  impacts	  on	  practices.	  	  
v	   For	  a	  more	  detailed	  overview	  on	  policy	   instruments	  and	  actor	   constellations,	   see	   (Heidbreder	  
2011).	  
vi	   The	   regulation	  of	   Services	  of	  General	   (Economic)	   Interest	   (SGEI/SGI)	  was	  already	  enshrined	   in	  
the	  Treaty	  of	  Rome.	  A	  reference	  to	  SGEI/SGI	  was	  introduced	  in	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Amsterdam	  (Article	  16,	  
EC)	  highlighting	  the	  fundamental	  character	  of	  the	  values	  underpinning	  such	  services	  (Commission	  of	  
the	   European	   Communities	   2001b).	   As	   a	   term	   for	   public	   services	   that	   cannot	   be	   equally	   well-­‐
provided	  by	  private	  services	  “the	  very	  concept	  of	  services	  of	  general	  interest	  was	  developed	  by	  the	  
European	  Community”	  (Mangenot	  2005:	  4).	  Obviously,	  the	  authority	  to	  define	  what	  falls	  under	  na-­‐
tional	  authority	  of	  SGEI	  or	  rather	  the	  Community’s	  competition	  laws	  is	  crucial	  for	  the	  actual	  respon-­‐
sibilities	  of	  national	  public	  administrations	  in	  areas	  such	  as	  water	  management,	  telecommunications	  
or	  energy	  supply	  (services	  of	  general	  economic	   interest),	  but	  also	  security	  or	  education	  (services	  of	  
general	  interest).	  For	  the	  Commission,	  SGI	  generally	  also	  includes	  social	  services	  (Commission	  of	  the	  
European	  Communities	  2006).	   In	  essence,	  the	  delimitation	  of	  national	  SGEI/SGI	  by	  the	  Commission	  
or	  the	  ECJ	  does	  not	  only	  impact	  the	  structure	  and	  practices	  of	  national	  administrations	  but	  their	  very	  
functions	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   it	   implies	   the	   prohibition	   of	   public	   monopolies	   in	   certain	   areas.	   The	  
Commission	  recognizes	  that	  the	  mission	  to	  fulfill	  a	  general	  interest	  takes	  precedent	  over	  the	  compe-­‐
tition	   rules	  of	   the	  EC	  Treaties	  and	   that,	   in	  particular,	  many	  social	  and	  health	   services	   imply	  obliga-­‐
tions	  that	  differ	  substantially	  from	  those	  offered	  on	  a	  commercial	  basis	  (Commission	  of	  the	  European	  
Communities	  2004).	  This	  notwithstanding,	  short	  of	  a	  precise	  definition	  of	  the	  distinguishing	  line	  be-­‐
tween	  SGEI/SGI	  and	  the	  EC	   founding	  principles	  of	  anti-­‐trust	  and	  competition,	   there	   is	  considerable	  
scope	  to	  demark	  the	  actual	  functions	  of	  national	  public	  administrations.	  	  
vii	   See	  EUPAN	  website	  http://www.eupan.eu/3/70/	  (last	  accessed	  February	  17,	  2011).	  	  
viii	   Demir	   formulates	   the	  variables	   in	  normative,	  prescriptive	   terms,	   i.e.	   the	  behavior	  elected	  and	  
administrative	  aught	  to	  show	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  complementarity.	  He	  then	  measures	  to	  which	  de-­‐
gree	   city	   managers	   adhere	   to	   these	   to	   these	   standards	   and	   finds	   that	   “politics	   and	  management	  
seem	  to	  have	  a	  dichotomous-­‐like	  relationship,	  while	  policy	  and	  administration	  seem	  to	  be	  blended,	  
with	  reciprocal	   influence	  and	  overlapping	  roles”	  (Demir	  2009:	  885).	   I	  do	  not	  refer	  to	  the	  normative	  
language	  but	  use	   the	  variables	  as	  measure	   for	  a	   complementary	   relationship	  between	  politics	  and	  
administration.	  Unlike	  Demir,	  the	  goal	  is	  not	  to	  test	  whether	  certain	  administrations	  meet	  the	  criteria	  
of	  complementarity.	  The	  goal	  is	  to	  see	  whether	  the	  degree	  of	  complementarity	  has	  changed	  in	  one	  
or	  another	  direction	  due	  to	   inclusion	  of	  public	  administrators	  and	  political	  decision	  makers	   into	  EU	  
policy	  making.	  	  	  	  
ix	   For	  the	  data	  on	  Germany,	  see	  an	  earlier	  comparative	  analysis	  of	  German	  and	   Italian	  EU	  policy	  
coordination	   (unpublished	   conference	   paper,	   available	   at:	   http://www.sog-­‐
rc27.org/paper/berlin2010/Heidbreder.pdf).	  	  
x	   A	  case	  in	  point	  are	  the	  rigid	  budgetary	  controls	  the	  EP	  put	  on	  the	  Commission	  after	  the	  demis-­‐
sion	  of	  the	  Santer	  Commission.	  
xi	   The	   struggle	   to	   cut	   red	   tape	   in	   Brussels	  may	   be	   read	   as	   anecdotal	   evidence	   of	   this,	   see	   e.g.	  
http://www.euractiv.com/en/innovation/governments-­‐failing-­‐deliver-­‐red-­‐tape-­‐industry/article-­‐
173181	   ;	   and	   the	   Commission’s	   dossier	   on	   administrative	   burdens:	  
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/better-­‐regulation/administrative-­‐burdens/	  .	  
